Being Secure in the Baltic Sea Region

A Handbook of a priority area
Project named 14point3 (14.3) under EUSBSR PA 14 is launched. At that point (mid-2012) the project is the only flagship project that addresses civil protection on land in the Baltic Sea region. Its partnership includes all BSR countries.
The Core of Priority Area Secure*

Danish Emergency Management Agency

Fire and Rescue Department under the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Lithuania

Estonian Ministry of the Interior
Estonian Rescue Board

State Fire and Rescue Service of Latvia

Ministry of the Interior, Finland

Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency

Fire and Rescue Department under the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Lithuania

Danish Emergency Management Agency

National Headquarters of the State Fire Service of Poland

Hamburg Fire Service Academy, Germany

*List of the institutions active as focal points for the priority area secure in the EU member states in the Baltic Sea region
This book traces the period roughly between the end of 2011 until 2013, which was the becoming of the priority area (PA) Secure of the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR.) While registering the first steps of PA Secure this book also opens an outlook for the work of this priority area in the future.

It is a handbook because it provides basic documents, informs about essential rationale behind the activities of this priority area, delivers an expert study and recommendations on the focal focus of PA Secure, and provides details and facts about its concrete activities and projects.

As such, the handbook consists of three parts. The first part uncovers contextual background of a discussion behind the very becoming of this priority area within the particular setting of the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, whilst placing it in a perspective that enables one to draw a future vision for the priority area. This part also explains the background to commissioning the expert study that makes up the second part of the book. This study, we argue, is necessary for placement of the priority area within those already elaborated cooperation frameworks. Finally, in its third part, this book provides references to concrete activities, projects and events that shape the body of the whole priority area.

This handbook is the result of efforts, support and contributions, both direct and indirect, by a great number of people, whole-heartedly committed to the cause of priority area Secure becoming a living and visionary platform for collaboration in civil security in the Baltic Sea region. The editors of this handbook would like to express particular appreciation for the individual commitment and support from representatives of National competent civil protection authorities, acting as focal points for the PA Secure in the Baltic Sea region.
Being Secure in the Baltic Sea Region

European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region priority area (PA) Secure is aimed at coordinating, facilitating and enhancing joint macro-regional efforts in protection from emergencies and accidents on land.

PA Secure is coordinated by Sweden (the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency / Myndigheten för Samhällsskydd och Beredskap, MSB) and the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) Secretariat.

The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (Swedish: Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap, MSB) is a Swedish government agency that combines now-defunct Swedish Rescue Services Agency, Swedish Emergency Management Agency, and National Board of Psychological Defence. The Swedish government decreed that on 1 January 2009 a new authority, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, would come into force to strengthen Sweden’s civil protection and emergency preparedness. The new authority would be responsible for unifying, coordinating, and supportive tasks prior to, during and after emergencies.

The Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) is a forum for regional inter-governmental cooperation. The Members of the Council are the 11 states (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia and Sweden) of the Baltic Sea region as well as the European Union. CBSS aims to facilitate and enhance cooperation in the Baltic Sea region through network and project based activities, and provides a platform for governments, organisations, communities and people to strengthen partnerships and seek out new ones.

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The Feasibility Study and Report presented in the second chapter of this handbook is entitled Implementing and Institutionalising Civil Protection in the Baltic Sea Region based on the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region. The Study was originally commissioned in the context of 2 out of a total of 24 actions related to the implementation of the Technical Assistance application to aid the EUSBSR priority area 14 in which the Council of the Baltic Sea States Secretariat acted as the Coordinator on behalf of the priority area Coordinator – the Danish Defence Command, Denmark. The Actions focused on the coordination and promotion of activities of the priority area 14 of the EUSBSR over a 26 month period (1 November 2011 – 31 December 2013.) Since this time the Action Plan of the EUSBSR has been revised, the priority areas have lost their numbers and a new priority area Secure has been born which focuses on closely related topics but with a distinct all-hazards based approach.

Cutting backwards to spring 2012, the original aim of commissioning and subcontracting the feasibility study was to discuss how to better institutionalise macro-regional cooperation in the fields related to the then priority area 14 (e.g. joint education, joint procedures and so forth.) This was shortly followed by the organisation of a stakeholder meeting in Stockholm to discuss the issues raised in the feasibility study.
The first meeting took place on 7 June 2012, Stockholm

The Workshop on the Feasibility Study of the future of priority area 14, and in particular with regard to activities undertaken in subtheme 14.3 Macro-Regional Risk Scenario/Hazard and Gap Analysis gathered several experts.

See list of participants on p.61.

The Second meeting took place on 8 November, Helsinki

Civil security has been in focus at the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) since its establishment in 1992. Indeed the very first CBSS Expert Group created focused on Nuclear and Radiation Safety (CBSS EGNRS) and traces its origin back to the inception of the CBSS itself. Activities in this broad field have been supported by the CBSS Permanent International Secretariat since its establishment in 1998. The first meeting of the Directors-General of Civil Protection of the Baltic Sea States was convened in 2001. The substantial and vibrant cooperation in civil protection through the CBSS Civil Protection Network has continued and strengthened throughout this time. The Network consists of representatives from the assigned civil protection authorities in the region. The sustained work on related topics is affiliated to the CBSS through the priority area of Safe and Secure Region, which is a broad area encompassing several fields of enquiry and function. The pooled expertise which the CBSS Expert Groups, Task Forces and affiliated networks bring forward covers Border Guard Cooperation, including maritime surveillance, counter-trafficking, children at risk, tax crime and emergency preparedness at sea and on land.

More specifically, civil security (at times also referred to as civil protection) as a priority is presently and primarily addressed by three inter-connected modes of coordinated cooperation, namely:

- the CBSS Civil Protection Network
- the CBSS Expert Group on Nuclear and Radiation Safety
- their corresponding activities and aligned projects in which the overall implementing body is the CBSS Secretariat, and the concrete input given to the integrated framework of the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region under the objectives of Safe the Sea and Increasing Prosperity.

Even though each remains distinct in operating logic and nature, they complement one another and provide cohesion to the form of civil protection cooperation in the region.

November 2008

Pre-Strategy Stakeholder Conference on ‘Safety and Security’ in Helsinki

The Council of the Baltic Sea States Secretariat was the co-organiser of the first pre-Strategy stakeholder conference on ‘Safety and Security’ in Helsinki. The CBSS Civil Protection Network was mandated by the CBSS Secretariat to function as the Lead Partner of the flagship project 14.3 when applying for funding from the EU Civil Protection Financial Instrument.

Given the concrete nature of the cooperation within this field under the auspices of the CBSS, the CBSS Secretariat followed with interest the negotiations on and subsequent adoption of the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR) Action Plan in 2009. The initial Action Plan accompanying the Strategy had a limited civil protection focus mostly through its priority area 14. To reinforce maritime accident response capacity protection from major emergencies, the limitation lay in the narrow focus on maritime issues as well as limiting actions to major emergencies.

The priority area (PA) was firstly coordinated solely by Denmark through its Danish Defence Command. In parallel to this development the CBSS Civil Protection Network decided to design a project that would become a test of how far states can reach in intergovernmental cooperation to ensure interoperability in the Baltic Sea region.

Against the backdrop of the European Commission (EC) Staff Working Paper on Risk Assessment and Guidelines for Disaster Management and the EU call to its Member States to have a national risk assessment in place by the end of 2011, the Civil Protection Network negotiated what was to become flagship project 14.3 Macro-Regional Risk Scenarios and Gaps Identification2.

1 Credit for this goes to Dr. Christer Pursiainen, then Senior Adviser, Council of the Baltic Sea States Secretariat (CBSS) and Dr. Bengt Sundelius, Strategic Adviser, Myndigheten för Samhällsskydd och Beredskap (MSB)

2 Read more about the project www.14point3.eu here:
Given the broad partnership in flagship project 14.3 and the focus on enhanced disaster prevention and preparedness activities in the Baltic Sea region it was natural for the project to become a flagship under the EUSBSR PA 14. These developments culminated in the joint decision by the Danish Defence Command and the CBSS Secretariat to channel actions through the Secretariat and for the Secretariat to act as a kind of de-facto coordinator for the priority area.

**Autumn 2011**

CBSS mandated from the Danish Defence Command to lead the implementation of PA 14

In Autumn 2011 the CBSS Secretariat assumed the lead in implementing EUSBSR PA 14 through a mandate from the Danish Defence Command, thus the twin parallel track described before merged into a double lane highway with the CBSS Secretariat taking a lead in both.

**January 2012**

Project 14.3 is launched

Flagship project 14.3 was launched in January 2012 and shortly thereafter the authors to the feasibility study were commissioned. In their work they had access to the project 14.3 laboratory and could draw on experiences made therein. The timing allowed a cross fertilisation between the study and the project and the authors were invited to present their interim results to the mid-term review conference of 14.3 project which took place in Warsaw in January 2012. Nonetheless, the focus was never limited to flagship project 14.3 as such but it was rather used to inform the study which should address a wider concern – namely that of institutionalising cooperation in the field of civil protection in the Baltic Sea region.

**Institutionalising is a strong word and somewhat misleading – if flagship project 14.3 was intended to become a pilot to see if the Baltic Sea region could achieve higher standards of cohesion and interoperability based on national risk assessments than that seen at the EU level for instance – then the feasibility study was intended to take a close look at the general parameters surrounding civil protection cooperation in the Baltic Sea region and provide recommendations on what is feasible in terms of that cooperation.**

Bearing in mind that the CBSS Civil Protection Network for instance is anchored in the rotating Directors General meetings that rotate with the CBSS Presidency and that no Expert Group or Task Force is permanently mandated to focus on these issues the idea was to gain insight into what can be done to aid cooperation in this field even more. That of course by no means indicates a necessity for a new institution. There will naturally be other ideas on how to make cooperation in this field even more concrete than it has been, indeed the authors in this study have made a number of recommendations to that effect that the CBSS Secretariat hopes will start discussion in that vein.

**Early 2012**

Revision of EUSBSR Action Plan. Developing targets and indicators

The year of 2012 was a busy year in the CBSS Secretariat, the authors of the feasibility study had work, flagship project 14.3 was in the throes of implementation and through it all the EUSBSR Action Plan was revised. Negotiations on the revision commenced already in early 2012 when priority area coordinators (PACs) were asked to provide targets and indicators for their PA and update the description of the area. In the year’s discourse there were several discussions on how to address the myriad of concerns in the region, including those on the protection of its citizens and assets from natural and man-made disasters and emergencies. An idea to merge PA 14 with its neighbour PA 13 which focused on maritime safety gained some popularity but left the CBSS Secretariat and many of the civil protection actors concerned given the renewed focus on the maritime aspects of emergencies, the cause and effect on land would thus become neglected.

**Late February 2013**

New EUSBSR Action Plan adopted

With a view to the very concrete and real results being delivered by the project 14.3 and given the concerns raised there was a clear will to expand rather than minimise the focus on civil protection as a clear field of action that delivers increased safety and cooperation in the Baltic Sea region. Thus priority area Secure – Protection from emergencies and accidents on land was born when the new EUSBSR Action Plan was adopted in late February 2013. Cooperation in this new priority area goes from strength to strength and within the space of six months the number of flagship projects rose from two to six. At the same time the CBSS Secretariat was joined by the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) and now the two serve together as priority area coordinators, providing both the intergovernmental aspect and the thematic expertise of one
of the Member States in their lead. With the new Action Plan approved increased attention is being paid to the governance of the EUSBSR and as part of those efforts the priority area co-coordinators are establishing an international steering group to provide advice and backing to PA Secure.

With all the above developments taking place, publishing this Feasibility Study becomes even more vital in the view of the CBSS Secretariat. The study does not only give ideas to the CBSS Secretariat as the commissioners of the study but it will serve as a departure point, a platform if you will, for discussion on how to go forward within PA Secure.

The highway continues with its double lane, PA Secure and the CBSS Civil Protection Network, and the CBSS Secretariat would like to thank the authors for providing much needed food for thought to continue the journey.

NANNA MAGNADÓTTIR

Reykjavík, Iceland September 23rd 2013

The beginning of a task usually brings a certain level of assurance in terms of what one is about to embark upon, mixed in different measure, with certain anxiety, excitement and apprehension toward the future potential of the project. Sometimes the project is given clear frameworks and other times the situation is more fluid.

This is relevant for both our role in coordination and the commissioned task of the consultants presented in this publication. In the foreword to this publication written by our former colleague Nanna Magnadóttir, the then co-coordinator of the priority area Secure an outline is given as to the background of this publication and our reasoning at the Council of the Baltic Sea States in terms of the importance of this type of enquiry in the realm of Civil Security policy mechanisms and the potential institutionalization and furthering of such measures.

In this article we will focus on the methodology we employed when approaching the dialogue surrounding Civil Security as a priority area.

In our capacity as the coordinating team responsible to lead and execute the actions related to communication and visibility of the priority area concentrated on Civil Security of the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR) we will outline the evolving narrative of Civil Security cooperation in the region from the perspective of this key undertaking.
Working Campaigning

From PA 14 to PA Secure

Campaign context

In November 2011 the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) Secretariat was mandated to act on behalf of the priority area 14 (PA 14) of the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR) including the responsibility to define and implement communications strategy for PA 14. Each then, little did the Secretariat know that the assignment was about to become a moving target. It reflected the key encompassing civil security initiative that the organization was undertaking – one which was to be undertaken jointly with the Danish Defence Command. The framework was initiated within the context of the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR) it was the first macro-region strategy adopted by the European Union and has since been followed by the Danube Strategy while other macro-regional strategies are being developed. The task was to conceptualise and contextualise a strategic communication plan – both internally and externally – for the 14th priority area of the Strategy. The implementation of the communication plan occurred through a series of specified actions which were agreed jointly with the European Commission Directorate General of Regional Development.

In March 2012, at the 3rd EUSBSR Working Meeting a review of the 2009 version of the Strategy’s Action Plan was announced. This meant that priority areas active at that time became subject to change. Therefore our work commenced during a period of uncertainty due to the known certainty that the Action Plan of the Strategy which outlines and defines the separate priority areas was about to be placed in a contextual process of being updated and re-negotiated by EU Member States. It was not clear, for example, as to whether the priority area would be merged with another priority area that specifically focused on civil security only at sea. This uncertainty meant that communication points needed to evolve and reflect changing realities within the discourse between Member States but also remain in agreed frameworks under previously agreed contractual commitments. In short the brief changed midway through but simultaneously had to ostensibly remain the same due to predefined deliverables.

The task of the PA 14 communications implementers thus became tri-fold. The first task was to continue with contractual obligations to communicate PA 14. Second, simultaneously those tasks needed to adapt to the changing context. Thirdly and most importantly the task became the strategic employment of specific communication output as a means to assist the development of policy implementation, through lobbying and campaigning the interests of PA 14 stakeholder groups (civil protection authorities of the EUSBSR states who valued the inclusion of societal security in urban areas, land based emergency preparedness and civil protection mechanisms which did not solely focus on maritime space.)

The PA 14 communication campaign defined a strategy for bringing together two areas of work – communications and international coordination – on an equal footing. It developed an action plan for communication activities to aid facilitation of policy-administrative processes in a non-subordinate manner based on continuous dialogue. It introduced an alternative approach to the role of communications within an inter-governmental organization, as it was not targeted at a general external CBSS audience but rather the adoption process itself of one specific assigned task the CBSS within the Strategy.

Campaign process

The communication plan contained the following aims:

To create and develop a brand and slogan for PA 14 which would be bolstered by one active flagship project under the PA 14 as well as enhancing the overall (visual and contextual) presence of PA 14 during the overall discourse of the Strategy.

To use this brand to convey the gravity, necessity and impact of macro-regional risk analysis. This was essentially done by utilising projectized work to present the case for the whole potential of the PA, whilst investing this into the overall setting of the EUSBSR revision process.
Parliament (March 2013 and the 4th EUSBSR Working Meeting (April 2013.))

The first public event under the name of PA Secure was organized at the Swedish Permanent Representation to the EU, the evening before the reviewed Action Plan was officially announced. The event—a panel discussion and networking reception Impact of Macro-Regional Cooperation: What Leadership in Civil Protection Can Do? Baltic Sea Region example—was organized within the framework of EUSBSR PA Secure flagship project Baltic Leadership Programme in Civil Protection, led by the Swedish Institute.

In regard to the PA 14 campaign we were responsible for coordinating, implementing and strategising the communication aspects of the priority area which we placed under three main headings

- **Branding** PA 14 versus the other priority areas (15 in total) both visually and conceptually
- **Lobbying** for an expansion of understanding of the key term all-hazards approach and utilizing this as a slogan to create a policy conversation among varied actors
- **Public relations** with regard to identifying, contacting and cementing ties on a political and policy level for the cohesion and implementation of emergency preparedness in the region in a regional mindset.

### Campaign measures:

1. **Defining visual and conceptual brand identity.**
2. **Ensuring** the presence of PA 14 through strategic content communication of its flagship projects, in particularly EUSBSR flagship project 14.3, especially the use of the Oreflector artifact which could be read on different levels to signify civil protection values.
3. **Direct lobby activities and events** through targeting (EUSBSR Member State support; European Commission involvement; Ensuring Stakeholder commitment.)
4. **Indirect marketing** through case study presentations during EUSBSR workshops.

Since February 2013 the updated Action Plan has a newly formulated priority area called PA Secure. This priority area which concentrates on emergency preparedness on land and encompasses the jurisdictions of shoreline—can be viewed as a direct result of the work completed under Priority 14 which focused on all parties communicating the necessity of retaining land-based preparedness as an additional facet of civil security in the Baltic Sea region without falling back on the sea area exclusively.

One of these aforementioned Campaign Measures was the presentation of the burgeoning PA Secure identity, articulated through its timeline, which was presented at an audience with the Euro-Baltic Intergroup at the European Parliament (March 2013 and the 4th EUSBSR Working Meeting (April 2013.)

To mark this newly given gravity in certain real-time settings thus endorsing/ensuring the capital of the PA 14 brand be transferred anew into the revised Action Plan (after the review of the Action Plan had been completed.) This endorsement ultimately gave the launch of the new PA a strong symbolic ground on which to commence work.

In order to achieve these aims, the strategy of branding the project, was consciously steered to brand the process, instead of branding the expected result.
These three main areas were interwoven with certain outputs of the PA 14 flagship projects—especially project 14.3. The project was used as a vehicle to re-enforce the importance and potential scope of the priority area by using certain artifacts and presentation tools to enable a confident and innovative pitch to decision makers and elite actors such as EU Commissioners and Ministers of National Governments directly. These personal audiences later engendered an interest and support from high-level decision making groups and boards. The importance of the Communication Strategy laid with the elements of design utilization and public diplomacy methods which are usually only employed in the private sector and to a greater extent in art practice. These highly innovative and active methodologies may be commonplace in another setting but for an intergovernmental organisation were able to radically change outside responses to the PA which in the initial were critical or uniformed of what had been an under-performing area of the Strategy before the CBSS Secretariat became heavily involved—partly through unforeseen mandate difficulties of necessary actors when implementing actions and partly through communication activities being assigned an under-prioritized status among national actors. The campaign implemented for PA 14 enacted a complete role-reversal of view.

The Strategy was instrumental in prioritising a new and ambitious Branding Strategy for the priority area which was foreseen to be essential in order to move the conversation forward and underpin a certain ownership by the diverse number of actors involved. It was hoped the number 14 would become synonymous with an all-hazards approach amongst key individuals in the Member States which gave a back story to the narrative and would pique interest in a topic essentially technical and hypothetical. The public relations story tied easily into lobbying activities which were both region based and crucially in Brussels. Previous experience and current contacts were drawn upon as necessity—one needs to be comfortable with the mechanisms of Brussels institutions and the European Commission. Furthermore, the communications strategy included gathering and securing participation from different international bodies such as the UN to give gravitas to the work as well as drawing in outside knowledge and building upon relations with non-EU countries in the region such as Norway and Russia.

It was important for the coordination team to take a broad angle when it comes to the approach towards communication implementation and realisation of the importance of a theoretical frame for application. This was necessary as different key messages needed to be employed when focusing on different local, municipal, regional, national, macro-regional and international actors.

The value of aptitude for the necessity of communication not only as a profession and an integral component of the palette but a motivation which can be utilised to meet organisational objectives cannot be stressed enough here. Furthermore the capabilities which have taken the work and the operation of organisational communication to a higher narrative by placing it in philosophical frameworks are also worth noting here. We would even go as far as to say the work has become an embodiment of a multi-faceted communicative whole.

It is in this overall context that the publication of the Feasibility Study and Report is published.

Anthony Jay Olsson  Head of Media and Communications
Eglė Obcaršaitė  Adviser
Protection from Emergencies and Accidents on Land
In December 2007, the European Council issued its Presidency Conclusions, inviting the European Commission to present an EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea region no later than June 2009. Prior to this, the European Parliament had called for a strategy to address the urgent environmental challenges arising from the increasingly visible degradation of the Baltic Sea. The Commission presented its Communication on the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR) on 10 June 2009 alongside a detailed Action Plan prepared following intensive consultation of Member States and stakeholders. The European Council endorsed this approach – the EU’s first macro-regional strategy in October 2009.

Three years have now passed since implementing the EUSBSR. Based on the experience gained so far, the Commission put forward a Communication on 23 March 2012 specifying the three overall objectives for the Strategy: ‘Save the Sea’, ‘Connect the Region’ and ‘Increase Prosperity’. The Communication also included concrete proposals to set of measurable indicators and targets for each objective, with the aim of facilitating monitoring, evaluation, communication, and, most importantly, results. On 26 June 2012, the General Affairs Council endorsed this Communication and took note of the list of indicators and targets proposed by the task force of Member State and Commission representatives during spring 2012.

This document is the EUSBSR Action Plan updated to reflect the new objectives, indicators and targets that are fully in line with and contributes to the objectives Europe 2020 Strategy. It introduces governance of the EUSBSR in line with the guidelines for roles and responsibilities of the main implementing actors, which was also agreed by the General
Affairs Council on 26 June 2012. It also presents the work structured by priority areas and horizontal actions. The Action Plan may be updated regularly as the Baltic Sea region and its context develops, following an agreement among the priority area coordinators, horizontal action leaders, the Member States and the European Commission.

Although this is a strategy of the European Union (EU), it is clear that many of the issues can only be addressed in constructive cooperation with our external partners in the region, in particular Russia. However, the Strategy cannot dictate action to third parties. Instead, it indicates issues on which cooperation is desirable and proposes platforms to this discussion and cooperation. As the European Council conclusions noted, the Northern Dimension, a common policy of the EU, Russia, Norway and Iceland, provides the basis for these external aspects of the Strategy. Other fora are also useful, such as the EU-Russia common spaces and international bodies, for instance the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), the Nordic Council of Ministers or the Helsinki Commission (HELCOM). This cooperation is without prejudice to the decision-making mechanisms of these respective bodies.

A key factor of success for the Strategy is the integrated and coordinated governance of the Baltic Sea region, between sectors of society as well as between regional and local authorities in the respective countries.11 Without such integration, the targets will be difficult to achieve. The Strategy itself is particularly important in this respect as it provides the only context within which all policies relevant to the health and prosperity of the region are addressed. Its overall success will depend on the degree to which the Strategy is given weight and attention from the highest political level in the region.

Successful implementation of the Strategy requires also the adoption of a gender perspective in the governance system and the Action Plan. Equality between men and women is a core value of the European Union. At the same time, economic and business benefits can be gained from enhancing gender equality. In order to achieve the objectives of the EUSBSR the contribution and talents of both women and men should be fully used. Specifically, this Action Plan comprises 17 priority areas and 5 horizontal actions, which represent the main areas where the EUSBSR can contribute to improvements, either by tackling the main challenges or by seizing key opportunities. Typically, one Member State coordinates each priority area or horizontal action, and they work on implementation in close contact with the Commission and all stakeholders, i.e. other Member States, regional and local authorities, inter-governmental and non-governmental bodies. Other bodies may, also be nominated to coordinate an area or action. They need to ensure that the Action Plan is consistent with all EU policies, and in particular Europe 2020 Strategy as well as the Integrated Maritime Policy, with its objectives for blue growth and the Marine Strategy Framework Directive (MSFD) objective to reach good environmental status by 2020.

The priority areas are organised according to the three overall objectives of the Strategy, and one horizontal section. This distinction is for ease of analysis, but every objective covers a wide range of policies and has impacts on the other objectives: they are interlinked and interdependent. Each priority area and horizontal action starts with a presentation of the issue providing background information on the topic. Then, specific indicators and targets for the area in question are set.

By way of example, climate change will be adequately included as a cross-cutting horizontal consideration in the implementation of the Action Plan’s objectives, sub-objectives, priority areas, horizontal actions and flagship projects.

To translate this into results, there are detailed actions and flagship projects. Actions represent the main steps that are needed to achieve the agreed indicators and targets for that particular area, while flagship projects detail how to achieve (part of) the desired outcome. Importantly, flagship projects should all have a lead partner and a deadline for implementation. In some cases, actions and/or flagship projects might require a change in the policy thrust or (rarely) national legislation of the Member States in the Baltic Sea region. In others, they require financing which could be provided by private or public funding (EU, national, regional or local funds). All actions and projects should be understood without prejudice to the existing exclusive Community competences.

In a number of cases, the objective of the actions and flagship projects is to highlight areas of activity that are ongoing within the EU system or in other international frameworks, but which require greater coordination within the Baltic Sea region and consistent funding strategies to be implemented successfully. The Strategy provides a unique opportunity to do this. Work on the Action Plan should be carried out in close coordination with any such on-going developments (in particular new regulations), including at EU level, to ensure coherence and efficiency.

Governance of the Strategy

Roles and responsibilities of the main stakeholders of the EUSBSR

Further to the Commission recommendations in the report published on 22 June 2011, in the Communication of 23 March 2012, and the Council Conclusions adopted on 26 October 2009, 15 November 2011 and 26 June 2012, and as a result of the works of the taskforce set-up in June 2011, the roles and responsibilities of the main stakeholders of the Strategy have been defined as follows. There is a broad consensus that they should constitute the minimum activity that each implementing stakeholder concerned should undertake. Although not mentioned below, it is important that stakeholders at local and regional level are involved, when relevant.

\[10\] Common set of roadmaps between the EU and Russia. There are 4 common spaces: Common economic space, Common space of freedom, security and justice, Common space of external security, Common space of research and education, including cultural aspects.

\[11\] For an extended discussion of the role of integrated governance in the Baltic Sea region, see WWF Baltic Ecoregion Programme, Counter Currents: Scenarios for the Baltic Sea, WWF 2012.
The tasks of the **European Commission** include:

1. Playing a leading role in strategic coordination of the key delivery stages of the EUSBSR.
2. Taking the EUSBSR into account in relevant policy initiatives and programmes planning.
3. Promoting and facilitating the involvement of stakeholders from all levels of the entire macro-region and supporting them implement the EUSBSR.
4. Encouraging dialogue and cooperation with stakeholders from other interested Baltic Sea region states.
5. Facilitating implementation of the EUSBSR in cooperation with the Member States (i.e. national contact points, line ministries, bodies in charge of implementing programmes/financial instruments, priority area coordinators, horizontal action leaders) by:
   - closely aligning EU, national and regional policies and strategies with the EUSBSR;
   - supporting alignment of programmes/financial instruments with the EUSBSR objectives;
   - identifying and addressing obstacles to the effective implementation of the EUSBSR;
   - disseminating information, best practices and lessons learned in implementing the EUSBSR;
   - ensuring adequate internal capacity to implement the EUSBSR.
6. Consulting on a regular basis with the Member States, inter alia through the High-Level Group.
7. Evaluating and reporting on the progress made in implementing the EUSBSR and the results achieved.
8. Whenever appropriate, in dialogue with priority area coordinators, horizontal action leaders and national contact points review, and update the EUSBSR and Action Plan. Seek endorsement from the Council or respectively the High-Level Group on the proposed amendments.

The tasks of the **High-Level Group** include:

1. Giving advice to the European Commission on the EUSBSR and its implementation.
2. Providing opinions on the review and updates of the EUSBSR and Action Plan.
3. Proposing actions to be taken by the European Commission and the Member States to strengthen the EUSBSR implementation:
   - contributing to the implementation of the Council Conclusions on the review of the EUSBSR;
   - identifying and addressing obstacles to the effective implementation of the EUSBSR;
   - proposing actions to promote a macro-regional approach in developing new policies and aligning of programmes/financial instruments.
The tasks of the **Member State**\(^1\) include:

1. Ensuring that the EUSBSR is implemented and has continuous political commitment to it:
   a. intensifying actions further to enhance existing political support for the implementation of the EUSBSR at all levels (EU, national, regional and local), particularly by making the EUSBSR a reference point for all adequate fora;
   b. recognising the need to include the EUSBSR on the agenda of the Council in its different formations as and when appropriate to promote effective involvement of and closer links to relevant EU policies in the implementation of the EUSBSR;

2. Ensuring that national and regional strategic planning, existing policies, programmes and financial instruments is in line with the EUSBSR by:
   a. coordinating and integrating relevant policies with the EUSBSR;
   b. inviting line ministries and other relevant authorities to mobilise programmes/financial instruments to support the implementation of the EUSBSR.

3. Supporting the role of national contact point in national coordination of the EUSBSR, and the priority area coordinator(s) and horizontal action leader(s) in thematic and transnational implementation of the EUSBSR by:
   a. appointing a national contact point and supporting in fulfil its tasks;
   b. setting up a national coordination body to boost the effectiveness, synergy and sustainability of the results achieved;
   c. assuming responsibility for coordinating the priority area(s) concerned;
   d. appointing priority area coordinator(s) and horizontal action leader(s) and ensuring that there is adequate internal capacity to fulfil the role;
   e. appointing priority area focal points and horizontal action focal points\(^2\);
   f. maintaining adequate internal capacity to implement the EUSBSR.

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\(^1\) By the Member State is meant the national administration. It is strongly preferred that a national policy coordination is led by the Prime Minister’s office or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to ensure coherent development and implementation of the EUSBSR among the involved institutions.

\(^2\) The Member States are appointing priority area focal points (line ministries, agencies, other national/regional institutions) for each priority area of the EUSBSR. See tasks of the priority area focal points.

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The tasks of the **national contact point** include:

1. Seeking political support and commitment to implement the EUSBSR in the home country.
2. Cooperating with other EUSBSR national contact points to secure coherence and exchange the best practices.
3. Ensuring overall coordination of and support for the EUSBSR implementation in the home country:
   a. ensuring information to, consultation with national institutions regarding the EUSBSR and seeking their involvement;
   b. facilitating the involvement of other relevant stakeholders;
   c. maintaining an ongoing policy dialogue and working with the national coordination body to initiate operational action;
   d. encouraging dialogue between relevant programmes/financial instruments and national stakeholders for the alignment of resources;
   e. identifying the priority area focal points/horizontal action focal points.
5. In close cooperation with the European Commission, priority area coordinators and horizontal action leaders, participating in the review and updating of the EUSBSR and Action Plan.
6. Supporting priority area coordinators and horizontal action leaders in implementing the EUSBSR.
7. Monitoring and, on the request of the European Commission, reporting on the coordination activities taken in the implementation of the EUSBSR.
8. Encouraging the participation of relevant stakeholders from the entire macro-region in the implementation of the EUSBSR.
9. Promoting the visibility of the EUSBSR.
The tasks of the priority area/horizontal action focal point include:

The priority area focal points serve as a liaison at national level for all matters regarding the priority area/horizontal action concerned in the Baltic Sea region, states that do not hold the position of priority area coordinator for the priority area or horizontal action leader for the horizontal action in question.15

- **1.** Functioning as a focal point for the priority area/horizontal action in the home country by:
  - a. participating in national coordination regarding the EUSBSR,
  - b. providing information on the priority area/horizontal action to authorities or the public, whenever requested,
  - c. identifying relevant contact persons in the home country for priority area/horizontal action activities and flagship projects,
  - d. assisting the priority area coordinator(s)/horizontal action leaders to communicate and giving visibility to the priority area/horizontal action,
  - e. ensuring that decisions on the priority area/horizontal action are communicated to the relevant stakeholders.

- **2.** Liaising regularly with the priority area coordinator(s)/horizontal action leaders in order to:
  - a. contribute to policy discussion within the priority area/horizontal action concerned,
  - b. attend relevant activities, e.g. steering committees, meetings and conferences, of the priority area/horizontal action; and ensure continuous EU relevance in areas/actions not exclusively coordinated by Member States,
  - c. provide information on activities and projects in the home country of relevance to the priority area/horizontal action,
  - d. convey positions to the priority area/horizontal action; and ensure they are nationally consolidated among the authorities and stakeholders concerned.

The tasks of the priority area coordinator include:

Facilitating the involvement of and cooperation with relevant stakeholders from the entire macro-region and in close cooperation with those:

- **1.** Implementing and following-up the priority area towards targets and indicators defined. Whenever relevant, reviewing the set indicators and targets set.

- **2.** Reviewing regularly the relevance of the priority area as described in the Action Plan. Proposing necessary updates, including the addition, modification or deletion of actions and flagship projects to the European Commission.

- **3.** Facilitating policy discussions in the Baltic Sea region regarding the priority area concerned.

- **4.** Facilitating the development and implementation of actions and flagship projects defined under the priority area.

- **5.** Conveying the relevant results and recommendations of on-going and completed flagship projects to the policy level.

- **6.** Ensuring communication and visibility of the priority area.

- **7.** Maintaining a dialogue with bodies in charge of implementing programmes/financial instruments on alignment of funding for implementation of the priority area and flagship projects.

- **8.** Liaising and cooperating with other priority area coordinators and horizontal action leaders in order to ensure coherence and avoid duplicate work on the EUSBSR implementation.

- **9.** Monitoring progress within the priority area and reporting on it.

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14 If there is a priority area coordinator/horizontal action leader appointed in the Member State for the particular priority area/horizontal action, no priority area focal point/horizontal action focal point is required.

15 For this purpose, a steering committee/coordination group should be set-up and chaired by the priority area coordinator(s). A group should be composed of representatives of all Member States and other Baltic Sea region states, when relevant, as well as experts in the area concerned. It’s up to members of group to decide on internal rules of the steering committee. The group should meet at least twice a year and support priority area coordinator(s) in implementation of the tasks referred.
The tasks of the **horizontal action leader** include:

1. Implementing and following-up the horizontal action towards targets and indicators defined. Whenever relevant, reviewing of the indicators and targets set.

2. Reviewing regularly the relevance of the horizontal action as described in the Action Plan. Proposing necessary updates of the horizontal action to the European Commission.

3. Facilitating policy discussions in the Baltic Sea region regarding the horizontal action concerned.

4. Facilitating development and implementation of the horizontal action concerned.

5. When relevant, conveying relevant results and recommendations of the horizontal action to the policy level.

6. Ensuring communication and visibility of the horizontal action.

7. Maintaining a dialogue with bodies in charge of implementing programmes/financial instruments on alignment of funding for implementation of the horizontal action.

8. Liaising and cooperating with priority area coordinators and other horizontal action leaders in order to ensure coherence and avoid duplication work on the EUSBSR implementation.

9. Monitoring progress within the horizontal action and reporting on it.

For this purpose, a steering committee/coordination group should be set-up and chaired by the horizontal action leader(s). A group should be composed of representatives of all Member States and other Baltic Sea region states, when relevant, as well as experts in the area concerned. It’s up to members of group to decide on internal rules of the steering committee. The group should meet at least twice a year and support horizontal action leader(s) in implementation of the tasks referred.

The tasks of the **flagship project leader** include:

1. Ensuring implementation of the flagship project.

2. Liaising regularly with the respective priority area coordinator(s)/horizontal action leader(s):
   a. taking actively part in the work of the respective priority area/horizontal action, e.g. relevant meetings and conferences;
   b. regularly monitoring and reporting on the progress of the flagship project to the priority area coordinator(s)/horizontal action leader(s);

3. Promoting the flagship project results and ensure they are sustainable. Supporting the priority area coordinator(s)/horizontal action leader(s) in conveying relevant flagship project results and recommendations to the policy discussions and policy development in the Baltic Sea region.

4. Establishing and maintaining cooperation with other relevant flagship projects of the EUSBSR, in order to ensure consistency, exchange information and avoid duplicate of work.

5. Ensuring communication and visibility of the flagship project and its results.
The core issue for this priority area is civil protection cooperation in a macro-regional and cross-border context where:

- countries are linked to each other through geographic proximity, functional interdependencies or other mechanisms;
- assistance capacity is needed; or
- joint approaches and cross-border learning processes would clearly bring added value.

A macro-regional civil protection strategy should be based on an all-hazard approach and include the whole cycle of civil protection, i.e. prevention, preparedness, response and restoration. It should focus on hazards and emergencies, build on the cooperation within the EU Civil Protection Mechanism and take into account EU cooperation in the area of prevention, including the European Commission’s communication ‘A Community approach on the prevention of natural and man-made disasters’ and follow up Council Conclusions on risk prevention and risk assessment.

Climate change is expected to increase the likelihood of extreme weather events occurring at a shorter interval in the future. Other emergencies with cross-border effects could result from natural and technological disasters, acts of terrorism including chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism, and tech-
nological, radiological or environmental accidents as well as health threats from communicable and non-communicable diseases. Emergencies and major hazards notwithstanding the Baltic Sea region also bear great cost in the form of everyday accidents that cause mortality, morbidity and disability. Within the region, there are huge disparities in mortality caused by everyday accidents depending on the country, region, vulnerable group and environment. Injuries caused by everyday accidents do not ‘just happen’, rather, something in the behavioural cultures, physical environments or health systems affect considerably the number of injuries and their consequences and thus they are preventable.

More efficient mutual assistance and continued Baltic Sea cooperation on prevention, preparedness and response in the field of civil protection can contribute to improving the capabilities of the Member States to address cross-border hazards or emergencies in the region as well as improving the safety of their citizens in local communities. It is also important to mobilise all the forces of the societies to raise awareness of the public for instance an initiative such as APELL (Awareness and Preparedness for Emergencies at the Local Level) that together with other similar bottom-up processes, this should be fully applied to the Baltic Sea region. This experience could also serve as a model for capacity building in other macro-regions.

Indicators and targets

A comprehensive system for the design, the monitoring and the follow-up of indicators and targets will be set up in 2013, under the responsibility of the priority area coordinators. The still missing targets and deadline, baseline, and statistics/information sources related to the below indicators will be defined.

Actions and flagship projects

Action

Develop a joint macro-regional prevention and preparedness approach towards major hazards and emergencies.

Develop methodologies for enhanced cooperation between different local, regional and national agencies with a role in emergency operations relating to major hazards and emergencies, and on how to increase synergies with the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. Cooperation methodologies should be defined broadly and include public awareness actions, contingency planning, disaster scenar...
Action

Enhance a joint urban safety and prevention approach in the Baltic Sea region.

Many communities in the Baltic Sea region face similar risks. Therefore, raising awareness and enhancing prevention is of utmost importance. In many cases however the best new practices are learned through transnational cooperation. The Baltic Sea region has several transnational networks of cities, regions and other local actors that would be natural networks for developing transnational awareness raising, prevention strategies, urban safety and safe community approaches.

Flagship projects

—> Develop risk scenarios based on risk assessments and identify gaps for all main hazards in the Baltic Sea region in order to anticipate potential disasters, thus enabling a rapid and effective EU response through the EU Civil Protection Mechanism.

Lead: Council of the Baltic Sea States Secretariat.

Deadline for progress review: January 2013.

—> Strengthen training activities and exercises in cooperation with the countries of the Baltic Sea region, including on disaster risk prevention and management. Based on the project develop scenarios and identify gaps, and drawing on existing possibilities for funding sources under the Civil Protection Financial Instrument.

Lead: Council of the Baltic Sea States Secretariat and/or the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB).

Deadline for progress review: to be determined.

—> Develop a regional disaster loss database for all main hazards of the Baltic Sea region in order to improve the knowledge base and exchange of information, and inform the decision makers on the main areas for which a common risk assessment method should be developed.

Lead: to be determined.

Deadline for progress review: to be determined.

Potential flagship projects

—> Applying APeLL (Awareness and Preparedness for Emergencies at the Local Level) to address everyday accidents in the Baltic Sea region.

Lead: Member States and/or inter-governmental body to be determined.

Deadline for progress review: to be determined.

—> Effective learning and exchanging best practices on urban safety through a local city network. The network fosters urban safety exchanges throughout Baltic Sea region on locally-developed know-how strategies, shares experiences, analyzes functions and activities of municipalities and develops new safety management in the cities more oriented towards the needs of local communities.


Deadline for progress review: to be determined.

Action

Foster dialogue and common approaches to civil protection in the Baltic Sea region

A thorough knowledge and understanding of national and international (including EU) systems and funding possibilities is critical for civil protection actors and other stakeholders in the Baltic Sea region. This is a necessary precondition for the joint organisation of activities that encourage knowledge transfer and information sharing through formal and informal education and training as well as the development of joint procedures and standards. It has the potential to encourage initiatives focusing on new areas and ways of cooperation such as between authorities with different competencies and jurisdictions and public-private partnerships.

Flagship projects

—> Form a network of key civil protection actors in the Baltic Sea region through the ‘Baltic Leadership Programme’ and equip them with the tools and information needed to manage cross-border collaboration and projects between diverse organisations in an intercultural context.

Lead: Swedish Institute.

Deadline for progress review: 30 June 2013.
Implementing and Institutionalising Civil Protection in the Baltic Sea Region

Based on the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region

Carl-Einar Stålvant,

Pekka Visuri

Feasibility study and report

Edited by Anthony Jay Olsson,
Eglė Obcarškaitė and Nanna Magnadóttir
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Conclusions and proposals to enhance cooperation of civil protection in the EUSBSR and the Baltic Sea region
Civil protection policies and measures have been developed by national agencies with international support. Cooperative objectives in the Baltic Sea region are furthered in many international forums. The EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR), adopted in 2009 included cooperation in the field of civil protection as one priority area. This report emphasises the legacy of those concerns in the Baltic Sea region over the twenty years of activity of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS). A close relationship has been established between the EUSBSR, the CBSS Civil Protection Network authorities and the CBSS Secretariat.

The Baltic Sea macro-region faces common challenges and interdependent risks. With regard to such criteria as efficiency, technical ability, economy and feasibility, cooperation in a regional format is meaningful and provides an agile means for adding value to the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. Effective direct cooperation could be ensured by macro-regional coordination which aims to identify, prioritise and address areas or activities where other forms of cooperation do not match needs.

In priority area 14 of the EUSBSR, the flagship project 14.3, in particular, has enhanced civil protection capabilities for “all main hazards” in addition to three specifically assigned risk domains. One further and major assignment has been to develop macro-regional risk assessments. Such scenarios provide helpful instruments for identifying conceivable gaps and shortcomings in coping with extraordinary hazards with potential cross-border effects and a need for assistance.

The feasibility study is inspired by all-hazards approaches as they are commonly expressed in prevailing national concepts, in the EU internal strategy for security, and in accordance with the terms of reference for the study. One finding is that this requirement is very ambitious. The EUSBSR can contribute by project actions that drive cooperation but only within limits. The guiding policy concept of the 2009 Action Plan, the pillar “a safe and secure region” is operationalised by a few core hazards but overlooks a range of threats and more complex risks profiles. The strategy follows the convention to separate responsibility for land, sea, and man-made versus naturally created emergencies and risks. Such a state of affairs points to much needed inter-agency coordination and development of shared purposes. Hence a problem-oriented approach is proposed that could demonstrate risks and threats, expose shortcomings and facilitate inter-institutional coordination.
Executive summary

5 While much decision framing is internationalised and multilateralised, operational resources, experiences and knowledge are national and localised. EUSBSR Member States have sporadically called for response resources from the Community Mechanism for Civil Protection, the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC). Critical issues are a) the height and appropriate level of the activation threshold for intervention in case of disasters and critical events and b) how to balance the merits of precautionary measures vs. acute intervention capacities. Macro-regional facilitation brings added value.

6 The study has found that civil protection could be improved by institutionalising macro-regional actions within the stages of prevention, preparedness and learning/evaluation/training within the emergency management cycle while enhancing preconditions for improved cross-border cooperation, also with third countries. The strategy notes how pillars and policies are interlinked and interdependent. To this end, the substantive results of the EUSBSR flagship project 14.3 Task 3 analyses with the Russian Federation and other non-member states of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, and administrative support from the Council of the Baltic Sea States.

7 Proposals for new actions are thus forward projections: creation of a macro-regional centre for systematic analysis and education; elaboration of region-wide scenarios into training courses and exercises; close cooperation with Baltic Sea region network of cities and regions with the aim to further develop comprehensive risk analysis, enhance preparedness and to identify “best” practices and models for cross-border cooperation in functional emergency situations which clarify interdependencies. Suggested supportive and collateral measures outline a series of topical civil protection seminars across pillars prepared by commissioned studies.

8 A clear role for the CBSS Civil Protection Network to initiate and facilitate actions is envisaged, subject to a rethinking of roles of the various oversight bodies involved, a clarification of the macro-region’s cooperative relations with the Russian Federation and other non-member states of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, and administrative support from the Council of the Baltic Sea States.

Background to the report

The feasibility study is commissioned by the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) Secretariat and written by consultants Carl-Einar Stålvant and Pekka Visuri. The work was designed as one of the contributions to the objectives and activities outlined for the priority area 14 (PA 14) set out by the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR). Contracted in February 2012, the work was to be finalised within the first twelve months of the 18 months duration of the flagship project 14.3, i.e. in the first quarter of 2013. At the time, technical responsibility for this project was assigned to the CBSS Secretariat. Due to its comprehensive focus the study was carried out in parallel with the seminars and study work undertaken during the first year by the four task groups established within 14.3.

The terms of reference given for the feasibility study are to find ways “how better to enhance and institutionalise macro-regional cooperation in EUSBSR especially focusing on civil protection on land and sea”, in a cross-border context and from an all-hazards perspective.

Against this background and the terms of reference, the study is an effort to explore three themes:

Firstly, to ponder the nature and magnitude of critical incidents and vulnerabilities in the region and their impacts on public policies.
Secondly, to make an examination of critical issues in cooperation in the Baltic Sea region based on an all-hazards approach.
Thirdly, to assess the enhancement of macro regional identity in civil protection while taking into account regional legacies, existing patterns of cooperation and EU policies. On this basis, the study identifies some regional measures that might provide added value to the provision of safety and security.

The text is delineated as follows. In the introduction the emergent notion of civil protection as a new policy field is recalled. Some major studies and an official inquiry on civil security in the region indicate the salience of this public concern. A few central and disputed concepts are commented as they demarcate both the open-ended nature of the subject as well as its dependence on political changes. An introductory examination of EUSBSR PA 14 and the civil protection fields set the context for the feasibility study. Three analytical perspectives that guide the study are then outlined. It is followed by an overview of events and turning points in the appreciation of societal security problems. A series of national, regional and international events as well as policy interventions have shaped national management systems. A dose of regional history and organisation is inserted in order to get a better picture of the nature of the Baltic Sea cooperation and the role of the CBSS Civil Protection Network.
The report then traces some of the connections between actors as well as the significant changes in the regional and European civil protection space. Some critical observations and data on relations between the central EU apparatus, regional Member States and national agencies and other sub-actors contextualise our argument that there is space for a more pronounced and vital civil protection profile on the macro-regional level.

Lastly, various steps and concrete actions are listed that could be helpful in solidifying and institutionalising macro-regional civil protection. We acknowledge that some of these proposals are based on a rethinking of roles within the existing set-up of over-sight authorities and stakeholders. The potential value of a macro-regional and cross-border cooperation cannot be adequately assessed without attention to the quite complex patterns of agreements, coordination and governance already existing.

The desk study is based on material of different kinds. A wealth of planning documents and literature sources has been used. Observations of unfolding policies and efforts by the EUSBSR flagship project 14.3 partners to prevailing assertions and findings within societal security research are also related. Personal correspondence and study visits to regional and national organisations have clarified their role and contribution to regional cooperation.

A cornerstone of the process was to organise two workshops where the prospects and practical issues of civil protection and societal security were discussed. The first workshop was held at the CBSS Secretariat in Stockholm on 7 June 2012, and the second one was organised at the Aleksanteri Institute, University of Helsinki, on 7-8 November 2012. We thank the participants for their engagement and critical suggestions. Two pertinent observations in several interventions were most valuable.

Threats and risks highlighted by the EUSBSR PA 14 are recurrent and familiar rather than new and surprising, and, should they occur, are made by nature rather than by man. Complex vulnerabilities, cascading effects and threats to physical and digital infrastructures are not highlighted in the EUSBSR Action Plan (Version of 2009.) The study concurs with this view (cf. conclusions and follow-up measures.)

Furthermore, we had the opportunity to introduce a first draft version of this study to all members of the EUSBSR flagship project 14.3 in late January 2013 at the project mid-term conference. We received both new ideas and advice and frank critical comments to the preliminary text. These comments were highly appreciated and have been considered in this up-date and edited final text.

This said, it is not surprising that this sort of enquiry suffer from some biases, i.e. a Finnish and Swedish perspective and that many sources and references reflect this limitation. However, the rationale is that they have an illustrative significance for generic problems. A second caveat should be made, by not representing any of the professional or administrative agencies of the flagship project consortium, the authors have identified possibilities and a range of actions to enhance macro-regional cooperation rather than counting the nuts and bolts of the feasibility of any single proposal. But obviously the reasoning and results presented remain the sole responsibility of the consultants.

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Some milestones in improving regional cooperation in civil protection

Research

On the one hand there is a prolific amount of research literature concerning civil protection or civil security issues in the EU and in the Baltic Sea region context. However, improved knowledge does not mean that the findings of a study are directly used or applicable in practical work. On the other hand, many so called policy papers often concentrate on describing actual organisations and administrative issues between states and different functional sectors rather than providing guidelines and hands-on advice.

The general impression is that more attention has been paid to environmental and maritime safety agendas than to societal resilience and questions related to disaster prevention and emergency management.

During the first decennium after the geopolitical changes related to the collapse of the Soviet Union both the political and societal situation in the Baltic Sea region was generally in a transitional state. Only the Nordic states could continue or adapt their development paths rather directly on the same basis as before. On the eastern shore of the Baltic Sea almost all political, economic and societal structures as well as civil security services were in the middle of a turbulent change. Based on Baltic Sea cooperation as a general frame of action, intense cooperation unfolded in many constellations but in particular between the Nordic and the Baltic countries. These relations epitomised assistance to support new administrative functions, to facilitate improvement of security services and to sustain social stability.

After the consolidation of the state administration and societies of former socialist countries at the end of 1990s, interest for cooperation in civil security issues increased in the region. Some international research programmes worked closely with the CBSS with the purpose to identify critical situations, and to analyse and improve efficiency in crisis management and disaster response arrangements.

One good example was the research network CRISMART (the Centre for Crisis Management Research and Training of the Swedish National Defence College, Stockholm)\textsuperscript{22} CRISMART published studies and supported various exercises with the aim to improve knowledge on civil security issues and improving procedures of decision-making in crises. Individual cases and national methods of managing vulnerabilities have been analysed for most CBSS Member States.\textsuperscript{23} These schol-
arily activities influenced the tilt of security priorities towards political and military crisis management capability. However, also new demands for enhanced cooperation in the civil protection area were discussed and promoted.24

There were also other new research networks practicing in those fields, for example CIVPRO of the University of Helsinki. Publications from 2006-2007 were generally related to civil security/protection and securing of critical infrastructure against all kind of threats, terrorism included.25 Moreover, the CIVPRO agenda embraced environmental security issues as well as maritime safety issues.26 In other words, the functional approach to save the maritime environment and other safety issues rests on a solid tradition both within academia and in practical cooperation. These priorities are also reflected in the EUSBSR Action Plan (2009 Version, and subsumed under objective Save the Sea in 2013) and in the various PAs. The policies concerning the protection of the marine environment have also a long track record of successful measures, and these are still developing by way of flagship projects for safe shipping and transport for example.27 HELCOM is the institutional nucleus for all these activities.

Public enquiries

In 2002 the Swedish Government commissioned an enquiry (published in December 2003) on how to further develop civil security cooperation within the CBSS. The report was based on the comprehensively understood term civil security which was defined to encompass “a wide range of questions and it tends to be given different interpretations depending on the circumstances it is used in.” The description of the term referred to the 2nd Baltic Sea States Summit in Riga in 1998 and the CBSS conference on civil security in Visby in the same year, in which a definition was used for civil security as follows: “The state of protection of a society’s normal functioning from all threats other than military ones.” It was also mentioned that the terms “civil protection” and “soft security” are often used as synonym to civil security.28

The report (2003) assessed existing risks and threats, and it ended with two conclusions: 1) There is a lack of an overall view concerning many of the prospective dangers. Each agency or organisation is concentrating on their own specific tasks without too much thought on what the neighbour is or is not doing. 2) More attention should be paid to different ways of preventing a crisis. Today, the focus seems to be on developing resources and methods of handling crises, if or when they occur.

The study proposed further measures in the framework of the CBSS, i.e. to establish a multinational centre for the development of civil security, to be located in Tartu, as well as to develop a common centre for sea surveillance and sea control for the Baltic Sea region.29

Apart from these new structures, the study on civil security in 2003 also proposed:

- a centre for the development of civil security (research and teaching);
- to initiate a programme using modern technology to enhance civil security (linked to a EUI programme);
- to establish a centre for research and teaching concerning corruption and trans-national crime (for supporting the Tash Force on Organised Crime);
- to strengthen the Secretariat of the CBSS (resources i.e. for an information network for matters related to civil security);
- to promote an exchange of ideas with other regions (learning from experiences in other regions);
- Kaliningrad (an inquiry into needs and possibilities to increase participation in Baltic Sea region safety and security developments.)

Critical concepts

Although all these proposals were not realised in the envisaged form, the debate about concepts did not end. In a study on civil protection studies and arrangements from 2007 a definition was presented which emphasised differences between civil protection and civil defense: “Civil protection is a complex concept which is difficult to define, but is increasingly used around the world to refer to activities which protect civil populations against natural and technological disasters. The concept of civil protection slowly emerged during the Cold War.”30 It gradually liberated itself from the philosophy of civil defense. In this view, large scale disasters could entail equally devastating and costly consequences for society as traditional military onslaughts. Increasing internationalisation and mutual dependence also harbour vulnerabilities and unknown fragile linkages between complex infrastructures. It was realised that a top-down military command and control approach for civil hazards


25 Read CIVPRO Working Papers here:


27 Cf PA 13 of EUSBSR (p 10) and Maritime Activities in the Baltic Sea – An integrated thematic assessments on maritime activities and response to pollution at sea in the Baltic Sea Region HELCOM, 2010, Balt. Sea Environ. Proc. No 123. Read the Assessment on Maritime Activities in the Baltic Sea Region here:


29 Ibid.

30 Terhi Elomaa & Anna Halonen, EUROBAL TIC Survey: Civil Protection Research in the Baltic Sea Region, Aleksiainen Institute, University of Helsinki, November 2007, p. 5. Read the survey here:
Some milestones in improving regional cooperation in civil protection

is not the most effective way to manage such natural and technological disasters. It can be argued that certain traditional civil defence measures such as air-raid protection, and sheltering facilities resurgence after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the U.S. Indeed, terrorism has further complicated the indistinct field of civil protection and has brought new challenges to both practice and theory.

A study of EU Member States’ approaches to disaster prevention, conducted by the consultancy COW, observed in a 2008 report that the main drivers in disaster prevention process were external policy requirements, such as the Seveso Directive and the Flood Directive. 31 Member States generally appear to have developed quite effective and well-coordinated mechanisms for crisis management (response and recovery), also in regard to specific disaster types, anchored with and coordinated by, first and foremost the Ministry of the Interior. Among other things, this reflects that crisis management and civil protection are areas with a long history and a strong national momentum. Disaster prevention as a discipline in its own right is a newer area. This is also reflected in the fact that the concept of prevention is not defined in a unique manner; neither across countries nor within a specific country. Those observations apply to all the case countries and have been confirmed also by the literature consulted. Early warning systems and risk mapping are integral aspects of civil protection and widely acknowledged as important tools in prevention. 32

To conclude this short overview of selected studies, policy proposals and debate about concepts one can note a trend for a comprehensive approach and more emphasis on preventive disaster management. This paradigm shift was followed by new administrative arrangements within "civil contingencies" and civil protection systems in the Baltic Sea region and around the world.

The somewhat overlapping terms civil security, societal security, civil protection and soft security have been used in many studies as synonyms. They still have differences which have to be kept in mind. For this study we use the following definitions:

Civil security means that the citizens are protected from threats which can affect their living conditions and well-being. However, it is often used also in the societal context and in a sense which limits the responsibility area to be "below open military conflicts" as follows: "Civil security is the state of protection of a society’s normal functioning from all threats other than military ones." 33

Societal security is part of comprehensive civil security but emphasises more the protection of society’s normal life-sustaining functions.

Civil protection refers to activities which protect civil populations against natural, technological and man-made disasters and accidents.

Soft security as a term covers “other than (hard) military security,” and so it makes difference between military means such as the use of weaponry and arms and other instruments of influencing a human environment. It is not as useful as civil security in the field of civil protection although military organisational abilities and equipment could be crucial assets in critical response situations.

Civil protection is composed of a set of considerations and actions addressed to different aspects or phases in the course of an emergency or major incident. The number and sequence of these steps vary between operational agencies and between members of the international community. In their conclusions of November 30, 2009, the EU Council of Ministers underlined that initial work on a Community framework on disaster prevention within the EU should aim at “linking actors and policies throughout the disaster management cycle.” Moreover, the Council confirmed the two sides of emergency management: “the overall aim of disaster prevention within the EU is to, where possible prevent natural and man-made disasters from happening but if they do occur, aim at reducing their adverse consequences and minimising their social, economic and environmental impact.” 34

Influenced by the dual objectives of “Disaster Risk Management and Reduction” a Euro-Mediterranean programme on civil protection focuses on three stages or measures:

- prevention,
- preparedness,
- response (PPR) 35

Mitigation is an omnipotent factor in such coping strategies: Mitigation consists of activities designed to prevent or reduce losses that may result from an emergency or disaster. Often considered the initial phase of emergency management, mitigation activities may be a component of other phases, too.

As vulnerabilities, management capacity and needs vary between various parts of the Union, and then also between macro-regions, we propose that it is analytically meaningful to highlight a five-component cycle when discussing feasible measures for the EUSBSR. 36

Prevention is a series of precautionary actions to forestall that a possible risk (identified and known) is becoming a threat or measures taken to reduce the likelihood of an accident or incident.

Preparedness focuses on the planning and the development of plans, procedures, and capabilities that provide an effective prevention or response to an emergency or disaster of an unlikely, unforeseen or surprising nature.

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31 Find more about Seveso here: [Seveso Directive](http://ec.europa.eu/environment/chemicals/chemicals-law/seveso_en.htm)

32 European Commission DG Environment, Member States’ Approaches towards Prevention Policy - A Critical Analysis, March 2008. While acknowledging the value of policy directives we believe that critical surprise events induced many management reforms


34 2979th JUSTICE and HOME AFFAIRS Council meeting Brussels, 30 November 2009. Conclusions See also ‘A Community approach on the prevention of natural and man-made disasters’ (COM(2009) 82 final) and EU Strategy on supporting disaster risk reduction in developing countries (COM(2009) 81 final.)


36 See also figure 2, p.41
A comprehensive approach includes many aspects of emergency management: mitigation, prevention, preparedness, response, recovery and learning. Analytical terms often overlap with no clearly defined sequential boundary where one phase ends and another begins.

The all-hazards approach means that preparedness for emergency management is planned to cope with all threats and hazards, and cover all means needed, and the management structure as well as procedures should be capable to handle them basically with the same arrangements. In a communication on the EU internal security strategy the Commission refer to an all-hazards approach calling for cross-sectorial overviews of possible risks and current threats when drawing guidelines for disaster management.

The strategic objectives were composed of activities within 15 prioritised policy areas - priority areas. These activities were implemented through over 80 flagship projects. The functions concerning civil protection were dispersed in several policy or priority areas (PAs), mainly PAs 13, 14 and 15.

The two buffer PAs 13 and 15 can be described thus:

**Priority area 13** (Maritime safety and security) aimed for the Baltic Sea region to become a leading region in maritime safety and security. There were eight flagship projects under this priority area. One relevant activity for civil protection was the Flagship Project 13.1: The Baltic Sea Maritime Functionalities (BSMF) which aimed to develop an information sharing environment for the maritime domain in the coastal countries of the Baltic Sea region. It produced noticeable results, emphasising operational utility, which are apt to influence other projects and generic problems of communication and coordination in the field of civil protection.

**Priority area 15** paid direct attention to man-made risks in society and to illegal trans-boundary activities. It epitomised the established cooperation between police and other law-enforcing authorities in the Baltic Sea region. The focus was set on curbing fraud in trade and other economic activities as well as to combat the volume of illicit actions and harm done by organised crime, including trafficking in human beings from the dual angles of law-enforcement and victim protection.

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37 See e.g. All Hazards Planning.


40 See CBSS: Civil Security and the Human Dimension, Maritime Safety and Security Visit EUSBSR page here:

Find more about 13.1 here:

See also: Geary W. Sikich, “All Hazards” Crisis Management Planning. One school claims that the dynamics of response are apt to change the nature of the requested resources and to alter pre-planned coping arrangement but that planning rather than plans are crucial.
Whereas:

Priority area 14 covered many issues closely associated with civil protection as it was related to a second objective of the safe and secure pillar, i.e. to reinforce protection from major emergencies at sea and on land. 41

The description of the priority area 14 in the original EUSBSR Action Plan adopted in 2009 was as follows:

"Transport by sea is expected to increase significantly in the coming years in the Baltic Sea and with that comes a higher risk of accidents. While fortunately, ship accidents (in particular those causing pollution) have not increased over the last years, in 2007, there were 120 ship accidents in the Baltic Sea. Other major emergencies with cross border effects could result from natural and technological disasters, acts of terrorism including chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism, and technological, radiological or environmental accidents as well as health threats from communicable and non-communicable diseases. The economic impacts of disasters may adversely affect the economic growth and competitiveness of EU regions." 42

Three flagship projects were proposed under the EUSBSR priority area 14:

14.1 Assessment of volunteer troops’ capacities regarding maritime pollution response, as well as maritime search and rescue operations.


14.3 Macro-Regional Risk Scenarios and Gaps Identification – developing scenarios and identifying gaps for all main hazards in the Baltic Sea region, in order to anticipate potential disasters.

The objectives of 14.3 read:

"The flagship project will result in a macro-regional risk/hazard/scenario assessment and facilitate the development of disaster prevention strategies for the Baltic Sea region. It will enhance cooperative and inter-operative capabilities as well as enhance macro-regional identity of the competent civil protection authorities and beyond." 43

It is noteworthy that the aims of the EUSBSR tie in with the on-going work within CBSS under the heading of civil security and the human dimension. Since 2001, the CBSS Civil Protection Network has convened annually at the level of Directors-General to exchange views on on-going activities and to coordinate joint measures in the area of civil protection, critical infrastructure protection and other emergency preparedness issues in the Baltic Sea region. At the Meeting held on 19-20 January 2011, the Network’s Senior Experts from the eleven CBSS Member States endorsed the implementation of the EUSBSR flagship project 14.3.

**EUSBSR as a moving target**

Several developments since the EUSBSR Action Plan was launched have confirmed and strengthened an implicit division of work between land and sea. On 23 March 2012 the European Commission put forward an updated Communication 44 specifying three overall objectives for the Strategy: to Save the Sea, to Connect the Region and to Increase Prosperity. The Communication also included concrete proposals for setting indicators and targets for each objective, which would serve as a monitoring and evaluation system to measure progress. The review process for the EUSBSR Action Plan was endorsed by the Member States in Copenhagen in connection with the European Commission’s 3rd Annual Forum of the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (18-19 June 2012). Shortly afterwards, on 26 June 2012, the General Affairs Council adopted the Communication recognising the list of proposed indicators and targets. After endorsement by the EU Member States in January 2013 the reviewed Action Plan was launched on 22 February 2013. 45

The overriding pillar 4, a Safe and Secure Region, was hence absorbed by a reformulation into these three strategic objectives. While maintaining the maritime focus for PA 13 (re-named Safe), PA 14 was renamed under the heading of “Secure,” prioritising a land perspective on civil protection (including shoreline.) The responsibility of coordination also shifted.

After the revision of the EUSBSR Action Plan, EUSBSR flagship project 14.3, previously listed under PA 14, became listed under the newly defined PA Secure. The new definition, however, retained particular signifiers from the previous PA 14, namely:

- It will be a part of the process towards a closer cooperation and also towards better understanding of macro-regional and cross-border risks in the Baltic Sea region.
- The new PA Secure falls into the sovereign competency of the EU Member States.

41 An argument in the study is that apart from PA 13-15 various PA in other pillars by their substance and direction also contribute to civil protection objectives. A matrix in the 2013 version of the EUSBSR tries to envisage such interrelations.


43 Read Communication from the Commission concerning EUSBSR (23/3/2002) here: [Link](#).

44 Find 3180th General Affairs Council conclusions here: [Link](#).

While being driven by operational and practical needs, the design and aims of this flagship project could be said to epitomise or sustain the central concerns that were in the beginning of 2013 framed as navigation points for the transition of PA 14 to Secure. It explicitly included an all-hazards perspective. It aimed at identifying major hazards and complex and cross-sectoral risks. The composition of the stakeholders represented key authorities at central or local level within the fields of civil protection, emergencies and prevention. The consultants had the opportunity closely to follow the work of the four task groups that were established during the first fifteen months of the assignment. Thereby the feasibility study has benefited from the orientation and substance of actions within flagship project 14.3.

Project 14.3 established four task groups and a roadmap for specified actions: Three task groups had a focus on enhancing capabilities for risk assessment, and methodologies in preparedness within their special and professional branches. Task C had a broader objective and it highlighted major emergencies with multi-organisational consequences. Task A and B were related to the project management and the overall communication of the project as well as the task objectives and findings. The following mandates were given for each group:

**Macro-regional risk (Task C):** In order to anticipate potential disasters in a macro-regional context, to develop scenarios and identify gaps by bringing together the national perspectives, as well as to develop a methodology for a macro-regional approach covering potential disasters and to ensure mapping of shared risks or types of risks.

**Floods (Task D):** To develop reference scenarios using risk assessment information, to develop innovative methods and procedures as well as dissemination routines of experience and best practices of prevention methods, to encourage adoption of a common approach to flood management operations in the event of cross-border or large scale disasters.

**Forest fires (Task E):** To get acquainted with elaborated forest fire scenarios of macro-regional impact, to elaborate possible models to utilise risk mapping as a supportive tool, to increase knowledge on how to use simulation models in forest fire prevention and preparedness, to develop suggestions towards a macro-regional tool and approach to forest fire risks.

Although these alterations in the design of the strategy and political developments do not alter the terms of reference, themes selected and substance of this feasibility study they raise certain new questions about means/ends interrelations within the strategy.

As a general observation the authors would like to forward an apprehension: the reformulation of political overriding objectives for the Action Plan suggests a less salient position for civil protection concerns and disaster management. The benign interpretation is that much has already been accomplished and that satisfactory coping strategies exist. Hence when relating the Baltic Sea region Member States’ needs to these developments one must take account how such new institutional structures and political conditions impinge on the profile of regional needs, and the prospects for realising a more pronounced role for macro regional facilitation and cooperation within the EU Civil Protection Mechanism.


Nuclear and radiation safety (Task F): macro-regional risk assessment including identification of major gaps in current disaster prevention.

A clear emphasis on cooperation with regard to technical or methodological improvements and enhancement of skills and agency capability characterised the task group activities on floods, forest fires and nuclear safety, respectively. Floods and forest fires are among the most frequent emergencies in the macro-region. The purpose is to anticipate potential disasters, thus eventually enabling “a rapid and effective EU response through the Community Civil Protection Mechanism.”

Tash C had a more general approach, i.e. the development of macro-regional risk scenarios based on an identification and analysis of hazards and gaps. These macro-regional scenarios were based on EU methodology for risk assessments. The source for the work of Tash C was the results of a survey of national risk assessments. It yielded a close correlation between the topics assigned to the thematic tasks in project 14.3 and the priorities listed by national authorities in the survey. Scenarios were built on flood, fires and nuclear accidents. Extreme weather conditions aggravate potential damage caused by all three types of emergencies.

A heavy wind storm sweeping across the region was also basis for a scenario in its own right. A collision at sea demonstrated multiple consequences for different services.

The scenarios described how dormant risks can turn into emergencies with impact, yielding rather precise statements about the size and nature of damages and the efforts required to cope with them. Although the mapping of risks as well as writing and development of regional scenarios were at the time not yet completed49, a solid methodology for risk assessments and EU guidelines support the elaboration of these triggering hazards. Macro-regional vulnerabilities in prevention and response were clearly exposed - some of which could be located in the responding service and/or in coordination mistakes - and gaps were identified in conceivable cascading effects onto other sectors.50 One important process – generated outcome has been the development of a shared risk assessment methodology, influenced by EU guidelines.51 The six scenarios presented by the Tash Group C portray conceivable large scale disasters, elaborating possible ramifications of a single-source triggering incident. They have given much food for thought for developing feasible follow-up actions.

When considering accidents and disasters in the Baltic Sea region it is worth broadening the scope of the project by adding historical and conceptual perspectives. Without claiming the same rigour as in such scenario-led vulnerability assessments referred to above (14.3 overview) the EUSBSR should be put in perspective. An “all-hazards” approach is quite demanding. A single project within a priority area can only contribute to a larger edifice. In national planning, preparations for combating pandemic flu have much salience. One macro-regional scenario developed by task group C in 14.3 is built on such a contingency. In EUSBSR, health issues were inserted under PA 12 jointly with education and tourism – at the time in a pillar with the aim to reinforce and increase the attractiveness of the Baltic Sea region. In the new action plan Health is assigned an own priority area.

Flagship project 14.3 has enhanced professional competence in single agencies but parts of the threat spectrum reside elsewhere and call for cooperation with other actors or management by other professions. The EUSBSR has encountered difficulties in highlighting the role of voluntary organisations and ad hoc arrangements in emergency response systems.52 To cope with unknowns implies that potential risks and the threat spectrum fall outside of conventional and routine agency responses and might call for support and management by other professions and/or actors.

All EUSBSR members as well as the CBSS Member States consider a wide range of contingencies in national preparedness. Not the least the EU Civil Protection Mechanism53 has been spurred by major cross-sector and multi-agency crises where coordination of extraordinary efforts by national authorities as well as the neighbouring countries are required.

49 Finalised Six Scenarios and developed Guidelines on Macro-regional Risk Assessment can be found at: www.14point3.eu
14.3 Red Book One and Red Book Two
51 A common observation in the post-crisis evaluations of big crisis events in BSR is rather often misjudgements and shortcomings by the authorities and much support and foresighted action from ad hoc organized competence and NGOs. See e.g. Commission of July 22nd: NOU 2012:14; Finnish Government 7/2006.
52 Towards a stronger European disaster response: the role of civil protection and humanitarian assistance (Brussels 26.10.2010.) Read more about the Community Mechanism for Civil Protection here:
A discussion and evaluation of problems and prospects of an all-hazards approach in the civil protection sphere opens up two dimensions that could neatly be summarised in a matrix. One is the nature of international concern. In the project 14.3, international engagement is defined as cross-border effect and need for international assistance. The other dimension is the scope of risks and hazards that reasonably (i.e., in assessments of the risk profile of the macro-region) should be taken into account. The limiting cases are everyday accidents and catastrophes of gargantuan sizes.

Some emergencies or disasters are managed and manageable by available resources within the national management system. They have no cross-border effects and do not call for additional resources. Most of them belong to the category of everyday accidents or frequent stresses. (See box 5 and 6 in matrix 1 - but for the sharing of news and information) The national system protects its people and succeeds in accomplishing its social contract. Yet other hazards entail consequences across borders and call for coordination. Some challenges could have limited consequences yet hit two neighbouring sites in two countries. Where the prospects for such events are high, plans often exist for bilateral cooperation or management by combined available resources, (box 1 and 3)

The latter category could both cover local emergencies up-scaled to catastrophic dimensions or sudden ruptures “outside of the box” of imagination and contingency planning. Such “major” events, which were initially of only national impact but which later developed an international dimension of consequences have also struck the region. The volcanic ash cloud after the Eyjafjallajökull eruption stands out as an extreme event with costly impacts. The triggering emergency could both be local/subregional or major/national.

When a country is hit by a major disaster, the consequences might be devastating. In this event, a request for international assistance does not require that another country is affected. (box 8) A local but inconceivable hazard and insufficient capacity-development could also be a reason for foreign assistance. (box 7)

What is a feasible and appropriate level for satisfying civil protection objectives in a multilateral space that stretches across several layers from the local to the supranational or global? It seems that EUSBSR in the 2009 action plan did not address events in box 5 and 6.

As a third tool, concepts and distinctions introduced earlier (such as the component cycle), clarified various steps in a civil protection management cycle. They will serve as guides in the search for an answer to the problem of management domains. A critical test for regional added value is an improved ability to calibrate risks with preventive measures and mitigation efforts.

Apart from the PA 14, other PAs or actions in the strategy nevertheless have potential civil protection relevance although they are justified by other motives and considerations. Man-made threats and emergency situations, e.g., those stemming from terrorism or border-crossing criminality were dealt with in PA 15 and 7 (research and innovation), public health in 12. A systematic analysis of the interconnections between the different elements of EUSBSR from the vantage point of societal security and civil protection could enhance the relevance of the macro-regional platform.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of hazard</th>
<th>Routine/modest or spatially concentrated</th>
<th>Major event and national coverage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cross border</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Proximate neighbour</td>
<td>Box 1</td>
<td>Box 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Assistance</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>National/self help means</td>
<td>Box 5</td>
<td>Box 6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Extranational</td>
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</table>
A Finnish study\(^4\) found the following general trends concerning the development of national crisis management systems in Europe:

- **During the early nineties**, emphasis clearly shifted from preparedness for total war to prevention of and response for coping with peace-time disasters and terrorism.
- **In many EU countries**, the crisis management (CM) systems have been fundamentally modernised during the last years.
- **Trend towards adoption** of all-hazards principle in crisis management.
- **EU policy documents** try to strike a balance between disaster prevention and preparedness and responses as the dual cornerstones of the strategy on disaster management.\(^5\)
- **More centralisation** and integration of leadership and coordination for civil-military cooperation and assistance interventions in hostile environments and severe disasters.
- **An emerging trend** has been to standardise civil-military structures and practices, but the process is slow advancing.
- **More centralised surveillance** and efforts to build a common situation picture, but professional traditions and borderlines between sectors of administration still exist as a hindrance.

Comparative studies have asserted that crisis management systems (i.e. preparedness for disasters and other crisis situations which are threaten the state, society or citizens) have been developed on the basis of national historic experience. They are applied according to the national characters of each country’s political system, changes in threat perceptions and as reaction to the latest experiences in dramatic crisis situations. The national set-ups are not so much results of theoretical considerations and scientific studies or copied from the experience of other countries.\(^6\) That is why the crisis management systems also in European countries differ remarkably and it is difficult to shape standard structures, procedures and communication rules for crisis management duties. Decisions regarding the development of the crisis management are

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56 See also FEMA 2009: Comparative Emergency Management Book. Find the book here:
European crisis management: lessons learned and perspectives

usually made as a compromise derived from practical experience and political processes. Therefore, the systems are often found to be technologically and operationally outmoded, too. Many noticed malfunctions in the system can be ignored or are covered only by placebo measures in order to avoid additional work or political and bureaucratic struggles.

As pointed out, differences between internal and external threats have faded, as well as the strict dichotomy between peace-time and war-time threat scenarios have been smoothed. Those preparedness systems in the EU countries which were aimed primarily to civil protection in war situations have vanished, or they have been changed to be used for countering peace-time disasters or other kind of catastrophes. All countries however grapple with the problem of combating terrorism and violence as well as coping with natural and man-made disasters on the same basis, i.e. on the so called “all-hazards” principle. These crises situations are rather different by nature and primary responsibilities are normally managed by different corps or professions. This entails practical difficulties, but they can be minimised with good leadership training as well as by standardised communications and logistics. Informed preparedness presupposes further academic studies and practical exercises.

Policy development at the EU level

For EU internal security the most challenging “common threats” are as follows:

**Terrorism**, which is perceived as the most dangerous phenomenon.

**Serious and organised crime** is of increasing importance and has cross-border impact on security and safety within the EU.

**Cyber-crime** represents a global, technical, cross-border, anonymous threat to information systems.

**Natural and man-made disasters**, such as forest fires, earthquakes, floods and storms, droughts, energy shortages and major information and communication technologies (ICT) breakdowns, pose safety and security challenges. 57

The Action Plan of the EU Internal Security Strategy of 22 November 2010, lists five steps to “increase Europe’s resilience to crises and disasters” which contain the following issues:

“The cross-sectorial threats posed by natural and man-made crises and disasters necessitate improvements to long-standing crisis and disaster management practices in terms of efficiency and coherence. This is to be achieved through:

- making full use of the solidarity clause: a proposal on the application of the solidarity clause will be adopted;
- developing an all-hazards approach to threat and risk assessment: guidelines for disaster management will be drawn up, national approaches will be developed, cross-sectorial overviews of possible risks will be established together with overviews of current threats, an initiative on health security will be developed, and a risk management policy will be established;
- linking the different situation awareness centres: links between sector-specific early warning and crisis cooperation systems will be improved, and a proposal for better coordination of classified information between EU institutions and bodies will be adopted;
- developing a European Emergency Response Capacity for tackling disasters: the establishment of a European Emergency Response Capacity will be proposed.” 58

Those principles and actions reflect a clear tendency towards more integration and cooperation in European disaster management.

Civil protection in the EU

Civil protection first emerged as a concern for the Community within the Directorate-General for the Environment, European Commission in the middle of the 1980s. The diversity of new threats revitalised safety concerns within the EU. In 2001 the EU Council established a Community Mechanism for Civil Protection. The mechanism embraces an all-hazards approach, covering prevention, preparedness and response, with the intention to provide an effective and visible demonstration of European solidarity. The mechanism is also valid for meeting chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats and the combat against terrorism. 59

The Council has encouraged the EU Member States to enhance their civil protection capabilities through a European mutual assistance system aiming at a further development/identification of civil protection modules and to improve their interoperability.

Apart from the Member States, Iceland and Norway take part in the Mechanism. Russia has also developed relations since 2008 based on an administrative agreement on cooperation, mutual help and aviation support in crisis response between the Ministry of Emergency Situations of Russia and structures of civil protection in the European Commission. A renew

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European crisis management: lessons learned and perspectives

Among the tools developed within the EU Civil Protection Mechanism are the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC), (a training programme incl. simulation exercises and exchange of experts) and the Common Emergency Communication and Information System (CECIS) (registration of civil protection modules and a financial instrument). The purpose is supportive and complementary, i.e. to “facilitate cooperation in civil assistance interventions.” These legally binding commitments have constitutional limits, however, as Article 196 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) exempts civil protection measures from legal harmonisation. Regulations and capabilities fall within Member State competences. The paragraph also states that actions should “promote consistency in international civil-protection work.” These observations lead to a small paradox. Civil protection has been firmly institutionalised as a major EU concern but has a weak legal imperative. This methodological reality has been characterised by the Estonian academic and researcher Ramon Loik as both policy transfer and a learning mode: “to use the EU as a policy transfer platform rather than a law-making system, and assist Member States in developing their own policies in close horizontal coordination with each other as well as within the EU.”

Emergencies and crises affecting the Baltic Sea region

There are some past disaster cases which are still relevant as examples for the shaping of scenarios in the Baltic Sea region:

The nuclear power accident at the Chernobyl plant on 26 April 1986 had a particularly dispersion affect across the Baltic Sea region. It displayed many typical features which should be taken into account for present work with nuclear safety, too. The most important is to observe the importance of human factors as cause of the disaster.

The sinking of the passenger vessel the passenger ferry M/S Estonia on 28 September 1994 resulted in 852 fatalities. The ship with 989 people onboard was en route from Tallinn to Stockholm sailing over-night. The vessel sunk in 50 minutes after taking in water from an opened bow door. The Estonia was in international waters at the time of the disaster but located nearest to Finnish territorial waters. Finland therefore took responsibility for the coordination of the international rescue operation.

The 2004 Tsunami that struck on December 26 during the vacation season, was a distant catastrophe in the Indian Ocean, near by the Indonesian coast, but surprisingly for authorities involved many thousands of European citizens taking winter sunshine. Just as three examples 571 Swedish, 552 German and 179 Finnish citizens died, not to mention the other nationalities. It revealed flaws in the Nordic crisis management system, and the lessons learned culminated in the reasoning behind the decision to modernise the governmental managerial process. The process should now focus on effectiveness and coordination of tasks oriented towards civil security practicalities. Authorities thus made a commitment to prepare for and assist citizens abroad in the case of catastrophes.

Flooding in the Northern Baltic Sea on 7th January 2005. The weather indicators predicted that the sea level would rise. This incident involved severe flooding occurring in the coastal areas of Estonia, Finland and Russia. In Finland critical situations arose in Helsinki and Lovisa and, the Estonian government struggled with response in Haapsalu, Saaremaa and Viimsi. The flood affected the Russian coast as well. Situational awareness there and communications between the three states were rather vague and incoherent. The situation was alarming for the two nuclear power plants in coastal locations. The event contributed to a more systemic response, planning and streamlined crisis management system for the Gulf of Finland and, in particular, for Finnish and Estonian emergency planning.

M/S Arctic Sea. A hi-jacking in the Baltic Sea began during the night to 24 July 2009. The Russian-Finnish owned but Maltese registered ship was en route from Pietersaari, Finland, towards Bejaia, Algeria. The ship was sailing Swedish territorial waters between Gotland and Oland, when the vessel was subject to a hi-jacking. It took several days’ before the unusual situation was reported by media. The ship sailed under hi-jacking through EU waters from the Baltic Sea via Danish straits and English Channel to the Atlantic where the Russian Navy at last intercepted it. The case revealed weaknesses in the surveillance and communication arrangements in the Baltic Sea Region and in the North Sea.

Forest fires in Russia and elsewhere in Eastern Europe during the summer 2010 affected vast areas. They highlighted the need to enhance cooperation in the fire-fighting and capacity in the Baltic Sea region.

Winter storms are rather common in the Baltic Sea region. They are often causes for ship accidents and flooding in the coastal areas. A combination of winter storm and cold weather can be extremely disastrous for electricity grids and communication networks. For example, in Finland the storms of December 26-29th
2011 badly affected power grids and communication networks. More frequent extreme weather is likely to cause these kinds of disastrous threats in the Baltic Sea region in the future due to climatic changes. In particular, natural parts and sand dunes on the sensitive lagoons of the low south-eastern Baltic Sea coast are vulnerable.

Massacre in Norway, 27 July 2011, as well as the earlier school shootings in Finland 2007 and 2008 are examples of a specific type of ideology driven acts of mass terrorism which until recently were absent in Nordic countries. In those cases the actor was a so called lonely wolf, but in the future organised groups of extremists could plan and implement attacks against societies and citizens.

An all-hazards approach should also be on our minds when observing and assessing how experience of disasters and developments of crisis management systems that occur outside of the region might impact on policies and planning concerning the Baltic Sea countries.

Some major international incidents have left clear footprints in national preparedness. The terrorist attacks in USA on 11. September 2001 and the Moscow theatre hostage crisis in October 2002 epitomise the category, but also natural catastrophes like the hurricanes Katrina and Sandy that hit US coastal cities in 2005 and again in 2012, as well as the complex Fukushima accident in Japan.

As far as terrorism or nuclear accidents are concerned it is notable that mere experience from cases in the Baltic Sea region is not a sufficient guide to risk assessments. In those types of disasters the probability is rather low but consequences can be very serious should they occur. Therefore the risks are clearly higher than zero, and they must be taken into account as relevant threats. Also citizens have right to be sure that all preventive and countering measures for terrorism and nuclear disasters are adequate.

Studies and exercises regarding terrorism and nuclear accidents are important both as testing of threat scenarios and training for emergencies. However, it is often difficult to integrate a theoretical study and practical exercise because exercises need to utilise another type of scenarios than theoretical studies and tests. As example of an EU project combining studies and exercises was project Poseidon in 2008. It was based on a scenario of hijacking of a passenger ship between Finland and Sweden and relied on studies of countering maritime terrorism as well as providing a Finnish-Swedish exercise of decision-making.

The civil protection management cycle covers many steps or dimensions. There are many targets that could be addressed by actions to institutionalise and enhance civil protection.

These various dimensions entail inter alia basic knowledge or fact finding, capability development of personal and collective skills, technical and logistical support as well as planning and the conduct of operations. There are reasons to be both bold and cautious. Societal security – to use a short catch-all for a number of overlapping concepts of security and safety practices – is a shared public good, with an inbuilt potential for yielding added value. Yet, when it comes to managing and averting threats to individuals and society’s essential functions national civil protection cultures vary. Basic organisational solutions display many differences, also between countries that in many respects are close. The potential for yielding added value on a macro-regional level is nevertheless substantial.

The starting point is the recognition of the CBSS Civil Protection Network as an important regional hub and intergovernmental platform and its tradition of civil protection management. The agreement on the CBSS Secretariat’s role to act on behalf of the priority area coordinator for the EUSBSR PA 14 (since November 2011) as well as assigning to it the co-ordination task of the PA Secure (together with Sweden) after the revision of the EUSBSR Action Plan, is likely to facilitate the interaction and cooperative synergy between all eleven members of the CBSS, including the Commission, and the eight Member States of the EU with regard to EUSBSR flagship projects within the area of safety and security. Three questions are raised:

1. What are the earlier experiences of the CBSS activities and programmes in dealing with emergencies and transnational hazards and in promoting functional cooperation among national agencies at different levels?

2. What are the drivers and restraints for the macro-regional dimension of the Baltic Sea region?

3. What is the standing of societal security within the EUSBSR? What does a civil protection and emergency management perspective entail? How could relations to other priority areas and strategic actions with a civil protection potential develop?

The legacy

As shown in previous descriptions of the region’s history of critical occurrences, conspicuous events and a widened understanding of risks have to a certain extent driven the agenda. Management responses have been forced by frontline realities, i.e. perceived damages and destruction caused by tragic ship accidents, major flooding and hurricanes. Old threats receded, and various risk and security environments had to be addressed by decision makers. Within
the work of the CBSS they could aptly be summarised under a few working titles. These concerns have either been registered as a major agenda theme within the dialogues of Ministers and national governments or been formally adopted by the CBSS as programmes or joint actions during its twenty plus years of work.

Excluding high politics and an armed military dimension, Baltic Sea region states defined a cooperative field quite early. Views converged on the importance of reducing societal vulnerabilities and to respond to critical developments.

A discourse of “soft security” accompanied the transition in former socialist Baltic Sea region countries, identifying two major preoccupations.

Firstly, to defuse dangers and to change practices inherited from the former system. Secondly, transition itself created new social economic and political vulnerabilities and a growing concern of harmful environmental hazards also caused by an historical exploitation of nature and dangerous production processes.

Reforms demanded support to prop up feeble public order when minority rights were disputed or when the number of refugees and migrants into the region stepped up.

Many ills were associated with a break-up or weakening of national security structures - armed forces, border guards and so forth. Permeable borders and a sudden growth of impoverishment among certain sections of society due to the sudden change in economic situation gave rise to vulnerabilities and a space for exploitation and circumvention of rules and laws in a changing and transient environment. Trafficking in human beings, illegal immigration, organised crime and smuggling took hold in the gap. Hence a space for policing actions, coast guard cooperation and civilian use of military equipment and personnel in search and rescue operations were admitted within the trans-state cooperation between national authorities that unfolded. Special task forces were established with access to the highest political levels. The political and legal aspects were epitomised already at the Ministerial Session in May 1994, when a Commissioner on Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Including the Rights of Persons, belonging to Minorities (the CBSS Commissioner 1994-2003) was created.

The notion of soft security was flexible enough to include nuclear contingencies and environmental security. To this end decision-makers were helped by an established stock of knowledge. In addition, and building on concerns raised in the work of HELCOM, sea navigation security aided by a relevant data base was endorsed during the Polish CBSS Presidency in 1995. So the terms deliberately designated a lead nation for specific tasks. The CBSS shaped the Kalmar Programme with its support for democratic institution-building accompanied by increased cooperation in the field of civil security. During a five years period 1998-2003 “civic security” was a recurrent theme stated as a “priority of cooperation” on the regional agenda.

Two circumstances facilitated the accomplishments within the field. One was the adoption of a practice established within HELCOM to designate a lead nation for specific tasks. The appointed country at the time was Sweden. A second opening was provided by the inclusive project-based character of a newly established standing International Secretariat for the CBSS. Subject to voluntary contributions individual Member States could “dock in” subject matter experts and coordinators reinforcing administrative support to politically agreed programmes or actions. A special position was created for Civil Security occupied by a seconded Swedish diplomat. Ministerial Meetings and a series of special seminars paid attention to a broad range of concerns.

The Polish Prime Minister suggested the harmonisation of technical rescue facilities. Representatives of the Russian EMERCOM launched the proposal to establish a network of heads of Civil Security Agencies. An inquiry commissioned by the Swedish Government 2002-2004 reviewed the field and the many activities sustaining it. It identified three core programmes: search and rescue services, disaster and crisis management, and surveillance. It proposed seven concrete measures within the framework of CBSS as mentioned above. Some of the proposals were time-bound to some newly established institutions at the time. Others have been more or less accomplished or have been furthered in other ways. A proposal on sea surveillance and the conduct of interregional dialogues can be identified under other priority areas or Horizontal Actions within the EUSBSR.

Commenting on the study and other initiatives within civil security, the then Director of the CBSS Secretariat, Finnish Ambassador Hannu Halinen, found that “a lot” was taking place. Basically he found that the enquiry had drawn two conclusions.

Although different actors to counter different threats and minimise risks already do much, there is a lack of an overall view regarding prospective dangers. Each agency and organisation is concentrating on their own specific tasks, not knowing what others are – or are not – doing,

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66 The CBSS Expert Group on Nuclear and Radiation Safety was established in 1992 and is the longest running CBSS expert body in the field of civil protection related cooperation.

67 Hans Jürgen Helmsooth, Chairman of the Committee of Senior Officials of CBSS under the German Presidency 2000-2001.

68 The network is well institutionalized and held its 10th meeting back-to-back with project 14 in Hamburg, in May 2012.


Now focus appears to be on resources and methods of handling crises, if and when they occur – rather than paying more attention to the prevention of crises.

In 2004 the civic protection focus was subsumed under the guideline civil security and the human dimension. One driving force was the concern for a deteriorating health situation and the rapid spread of communicable diseases along the southeast Baltic Sea rim – presenting another serious security challenge. A number of conspicuous actions and exercises such as cross-boundary and trans-nationally coordinated operations against organised crime and trafficking bear witness of both legal and social achievements. Not least, CBSS adopted social safety net programmes with the aim to support victims and exploited children and vulnerable children at risk of exploitation.

In short, these years represent a high tide for civil protection on the regional agenda. Over time, the creation of functional networks and the development of routine contact between sister authorities decreased the salience of the issues. The regional format was still regarded to be a useful one but was challenged by political and institutional developments. Some analysts have even noted that the CBSS has had an implementation deficit with regard to its own decisions. Other, wider international options emerged on firm legal standings and substantial resources. A political commitment to work through a common regional channel was on retreat and forced to redefine its role. Proposals were aired that the Council should merge with other cooperation initiatives. These developments struck a dose of pessimism also among observers and initiated a debate on reform in order to forestall marginalisation of the CBSS. One point of departure was that CBSS represented a link that facilitated interaction between the regional, national and, not the least, the sub-national level of its Member Countries and the European Commission in the Baltic Sea region. Thus, the work and agenda of CBSS impinge on or is of relevance also to other European and Euro-Atlantic organisations. Another important consideration was that not all members of the CBSS are EU members. Hence CBSS initiated a reform process under the Swedish Presidency 2006-2007 which resulted in the Riga Declaration on Reform in 2008 under the Latvian Presidency 2007-2008.

Possibilities and restraints

A number of scholars have with a critical eye analysed changes in the Baltic Sea region related affairs and interactions. Within the State of the Region reports published by the Baltic Development Forum one can find pertinent observations of the region’s place within a wider play of international forces. It appears that different logics for action apply, both within the realms of intergovernmental and community relations and within the confines of Baltic Sea region politics. The first level has to do with the appreciation of the Baltic Sea regional space within a larger Europe. Issues at the second level are generated by opposing tendencies and interests in the records of Baltic Sea region affairs.

As for the first level, engagement and attention has been influenced by changes in political interest and the investment into and opening of more potent instruments in international organisations. All Baltic Sea region governments adapted themselves. The Nordic constellation changed with Finnish and Swedish EU membership in 1995, joining Denmark. Russia scored a success within the Partnership for Peace and the NATO-Russia Council by the adoption of a Russian proposal in 1997 when the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) and a response unit were created with the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. The two major processes of transforming Europe a decade ago, NATO expansion and EU enlargement, impacted also heavily on the regional dialogue. These major organisations embarked on a programme enhancing their capabilities in civil protection and disaster relief.

The setting for furthering the interests of the new members consisted of a more delicate multilevel coordination and partner-seeking game. Based on other premises, the restructuring of the Russian State and relations between centre and regions also entails consequences for cross-border cooperation and hence civil protection within the Baltic Sea region. On the EU side, the European Parliament initiated the framing of a macro-regional Baltic Sea strategy. Indeed, an analysis in the Baltic Development Forum “State of the Region Report 2011” argued that there is an inherent risk that regional developments could be compromised if the search for a strategic relationship between Brussels and Moscow overlook inter-dependent problems on a sub or macro-regional scale that EUSBSR seeks to address. Higher-level cooperation formats could be challenging or risky: they could absorb, belittle or diverge from macro-regional activities that are embedded in functioning institutions. For the purposes of this feasibility study, it is noteworthy that three crucial concerns - environment, transportation and security - also fall within this often disputed strategic partnership.

Turning to the dynamics of the Baltic Sea region’s political affairs, there are two different mechanisms at work, at times even at cross-purposes or at least complicating clear policy initiatives. On the one side, there is the commonly shared image of a complex and self-sustained regional “mosaic” space among decision-makers including intergovernmental institutions of their own design. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov commented “the variety and originality of the cooperation ‘landscape’ in the North of Europe” but saw a need “to constantly coordinate actions and avoid potential overlapping of efforts of major players in order to enhance their efficiency and practical yield.” The evaluation of the need for synchronisation coincides with that of his predecessor at the helm of CBSS, the German Presidency, who called for coherence fearing fragmentation.

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73 Richard Bengtsson, The Baltic Sea Region in 2011 (Copenhagen: Baltic Development Forum.)
74 Interview Foreign Minister Lavrov, Amber Bridge no 3, 2012.
75 Ibid.
76 Tobias Eitzold & Stefan Gänzle, Creating a coherent framework for Baltic Sea cooperation, Briefing paper for the German 2011/12 Presidency of the Council of the Baltic Sea States, SWP 2011.
On the other side is the modus operandi of the cooperation actors and myriad of initiatives that sustain cross-border cooperation. Sub-regional and local actors tend to have disparate, overlapping, sometimes competing and self-sustained agendas, sources of funding and legal status that resist being absorbed by a neat vertical governance structure. This factor is a source of strength and one can very well argue that all riparian states and members honour a dual conception of the CBSS. They do not perceive the Baltic Sea only as a foreign policy-object, but also as a response to domestic interests in regional co-operation. This factor might also be facilitated by a geographical gradient in federal systems where delegated authority might sustain their position as equal players within societal security actions. The case is clear with respect to the German Länder (16 Federal States of Germany.) The extent of delegated administrative power to the regions is more disputed in the Russian case, but due to flexible multilateral and intergovernmental principles of interaction, Russia is taking part in many prioritised tergovernmental principles of interaction, as a centre of gravity in Baltic Sea region developments in general the EUSBSR is at odds with other and geographical concepts both with regard to a sea basin area and within the parable of region-building. Decisions and monitoring of its evolution are taken by the EU Council and the Commission.

The EUSBSR tries to abridge the dualism of the Union’s external and internal actions. The EUSBSR content transcends the EU territorial dimension in Northern Europe. Many of the chapters are composed of interdependent and transversal issues that in order to gain value, directly or tacitly depend on Russian cooperation or acquiescence. Certain risks are apt to affect all members of the CBSS in the same or similar ways, resulting from increased interaction and transaction in the Baltic Sea region. These are, among others, issues of environmental protection and management, traffic networks and pilot lanes, safeguards for the transport of potentially hazardous goods (such as oil tankers and ships carrying nuclear waste), migration, and energy supply.

By also including the other three members of the Northern Dimension, i.e. Iceland, Norway and the Russian Federation by assigning Programme Implementation to established region-wide institutions such as CBSS and HELCOM and to diverse networks such realities are taken into account. However, the Commission has declared that the external dimension of the strategy is primarily to be dealt with in the Northern Dimension format, “but there are also other useful fora.” However the Council Conclusions on the completion of the review of the European Union for the Baltic Sea Region adopted at the 3180th General Affairs Council Meeting in Luxembourg welcomed all the efforts made so far in cooperation with third countries in the region to attain the objectives of the EUSBSR as well as the progress in cooperation with Russia through the CBSS, as well as noting the 9th Baltic Sea States Summit Presidential Communique. The CBSS was also specifically mentioned in the Council Conclusions on the review of the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region adopted at the 3125th General Affairs Council meeting in Brussels on 15 November 2011. The mentions concentrated naturally on cooperation with third countries but also to look for synergy effects between the EUSBSR and multilateral cooperation structures and networks within the Baltic Sea Region such as the CBSS.

With regard to the EUSBSR flagship project 14.3 due to an award of finances specifically addressing the participation of Russian parties by the Swedish Institute which was channelled through the CBSS Secretariat, complemented by a clear signal from Russian authorities, Russia has also been an active partner. Administrative liaison agreements exist between EMERCOM (St Petersburg State University of State Fire Service of EMERCOM of Russia), CBSS and the Swedish Institute. This is quite crucial when the feasibility of institutionalising and making progress in cooperation should be proved. Taking into account the EUSBSR dictum that new institutions should not be created, and in the absence of an identified and fixed budget line, flexibility and creativity is called for when evaluating the added value of the action elements in 14.3.

The strategy is regionally somewhat self-contained or inward-looking as the region’s vulnerabilities to its surroundings are not highlighted. It is not clear what the locations could be for the various sources that could trigger response cooperation or invite measures that mitigate the consequences. The region is exposed to external shocks, although preventive measures and robust defences against possible risks are supposedly in the hands of the regional actors (with a possible benign support from the civil protection mechanism). It is quite easy to advocate the merits of studying individual cases or incidents and lessons learned from environmental history. An earthquake on the Atlantic ridge many years ago yielded a flood that passed through the Belts and ended by sweeping the seaside front and marshlands of Leningrad region. The purpose of the protective wall sheltering St Petersburg is officially to cope with such disasters. Long-range pollution emissions from Central Europe, as well as the Chernobyl accident,
caused some of the most sensitive and lasting environmental damages in the region. And it is well-known that sources and effects of climate change are not spatially connected.

The motives and considerations for selecting and defining the various priority areas and the flagship projects when framing the EUSBSR are not entirely transparent. Suffice to notice that the core of the work is to improve cooperation and to enhance capabilities in three important areas where the risks and devastating potential are chronic, known and shared. These prioritised areas have an immediate, concrete and central standing within national mitigation planning. They belong to prevention in the typology of civil protection management.

However, as has been pointed out earlier, a possible tension prevails between cooperation on all-hazards management on one hand and the more precisely delineated emergencies and the strictly organised and separate administrations that cope with them, on the other. For this reason, the contribution by EUSBSR flagship project IA.3 Tash C may be looked upon as an example for a potential way to go. It had a wider perspective in developing macro-regional scenarios.

There are other, topical and significant risks with a regional and cross-border dimension which have not been included in the action plan and its various PAs. Examples are provided by so called new threats such as cyber security. Critical information infrastructure protection, disruptions in transport flows and infrastructural protection. This is not to deny that many issues are sensitive and therefore, for good but not declared reasons, are better assigned to other cooperative formats.

Secondly, scenarios that are reasonable and conceivable, have a good sense of regional realities and in a pedagogical manner expose interdependencies, have many uses as tools for awareness-raising and for preparedness. A specific natural disaster that is followed by cascading effects into many walks of life (health, social wellbeing, water supply, technologies) may lay the foundation for training and exercises. An exercise could focus on soft values i.e. situation assessments, coordination and decision-making or on hard problems with equipment, interoperability and resources such as manpower and capability shortcomings.

Thirdly, value added in a civil protection perspective on the macro-regional level: Effective coping systems are necessarily cross-sector and multi-dimensional, and incite different constellations of skills and capabilities, seldom confined to one single authority.

There also seems much to be gained by a fresh horizontal analysis of the land-to-sea continuum when challenged by a major emergency. To our minds, the administrative delineation of two separate priority areas, the land and sea platforms for civil protection, respectively, is based on organisational designs and administrative convenience within EU and national structures. It could have certain drawbacks for preparedness and response. For this reason a problem based approach should be chosen in writing integrated comprehensive scenarios where both domains are exposed. It is well-known that management on shore and in the coastal zone and the intersection between coastal waters, national territorial seas and the international sea body is characterised by a multitude of agencies, shifting responsibilities and different legal regimes.

Lastly, climate change challenges should also be pondered. Civil protection plans might be the first victim if capacities and responses depend on overconfidence in technologies that are based on the assumption of stable and predictable man-nature relations. Mitigation measures are based on experience and standing operating procedures that might be undermined by draughts, extreme weather and hydrographical changes that flip nature and nature’s patterns.

The purpose of our observations and quick jump into the past is not to argue that previous efforts to cope with severe emergencies are adequate for mitigating new ones or that solid lessons learnt already prevail in Baltic Sea regional efforts. In our view, a fresh view on the decision-making space and available tools are necessary to solve the problem of defining the nature of risk and for finding the most appropriate tools to cope with them. The very drive for framing the EU’s first macro-regional strategy (EUSBSR) is as such a new layer and framework of action. It represents a step to facilitate a better calibration of problem recognition and responses within the Union civil protection space. By comparison, the effort to centralise the Homeland Security administration in the US was soon met by scepticism against an overburdened centre. Reorganisation spelled decentralisation and support from states or fusion centres. In the beginning intelligence against man-made threats was the main occupation but over time other facilitation functions have been assigned to the state level.

Hence, there is need for a more precise analysis of the character of threats, the criteria for feasible actions when pondering institutional responses and mechanisms. In such a work it seems that EUSBSR items could be cross-fertilised. An assessment of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism and its other instruments in relation to macro-regional and local competences could give a better ground for feasible proposals. To our minds the perennial dilemma of balancing vertical and horizontal imperatives in organising civil protection suggests a number of new initiatives.

81 Find Fourteen Point Three - Red Boots Two on Macro-regional Risk Assessment and Mapping Guidelines for Disaster Management here.

As the previous sections have showed, there are several elements which should be taken into account when pondering how to institutionalise cooperation in civil protection and management of emergencies.

We can identify some features which combined build a common ground for development.

1. There is a considerable convergence in the evolution of national policies with regard to civil protection, emergency management and societal safety among Baltic Sea region countries. All adhere to a wider concept of security emphasising the grave and costly consequences of natural accidents, disasters or man-made havocs. They subscribe to a scheme of measures and actions along a posited preparedness and emergency management cycle: To identify risks and hazards, to prepare and develop adequate skills, to prevent emergencies from arising, to mitigate and cope with them if they occur despite efforts to avoid them, and limit or dampen their impacts and finally, if possible, to restore or recuperate what was lost.

2. There is a common recognition that many threats and challenges are global to macro-regional in reach but trans-boundary or trans-locally in their consequences. Conversely, a cumulative growth of a local hazard might have cascading effects onto an upscale, regional format.

3. There is also a good track record both of the CBSS programme decisions and actions undertaken by various regional authorities and mechanisms within the area of civil protection. Although the institutional underpinning is variegated and diversified, this legacy should facilitate a continuous development of new and adequate principles and actions to cope with both new and traditional hazards.

4. A Baltic Sea region civil protection network, based on dialogue and cooperation between national rescue and crisis management authorities, is established and constitute key actors within the field at large. European Commission’s role as participant in the network is desirable, should the network, as stated in the revised action plan, have a formal facilitating role.83

5. The former EUSBSR Action Plan contained a number of priority areas with either other overriding objectives or aims that overlap with or are similar with those defined in the PA 14, and particularly articulated through the EUSBSR flagship project 14.3. Already the HELCOM Action Plan explicitly aims to “improve maritime safety and accident response capacity”. These aspects were further

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Identifying common grounds and restraints

developed in the priority area 13. A close connection existed between some of the flagship projects, e.g. between PA 13 and those supported by the priority area 6, i.e. maritime transport without barriers and control and procedural measures at borders. Furthermore, spatial planning is a central activity, widened both for maritime and offshore areas and within the established format of VASAB (Vision and Strategies for the Baltic Sea region). As these planning efforts primarily support environmental and economic objectives, it is fair to say that the perspectives of emergency planning and response authorities do not come to the fore. If anything, the heavy trends favor increased demographic and exploitation pressures on coastal regions.

For these reasons a series of seminars trying to evaluate the direction, impact and consequences of such congested action spaces are needed, facilitating institutionalisation and mainstreaming of the perspective in civil protection.

Natural disasters and global environmental change (as mentioned above) also have a strong influence on the security of the new critical infrastructure and also the security of supply chains. Installations such as pipelines easily can be affected by earthquakes, flooding, storms or other natural hazards. As result, the sudden loss of important trading goods can generate severe security problems for the society and people. They are by and large common challenges for the macro-regional emergency planning.

On the side, there are some societal, political and economic restraints which should be taken into account in institutionalising the cooperation. In addition to the above mentioned governmental and administrative issues the most important are the present economic difficulties which affect all cooperation in the EU and between the CBSS countries. Thereby, we must keep in mind also the cultural differences and prevailing tensions in the security policy between EU/NATO countries and Russia. These aspects concern other Eastern European countries, too.

At present the budgets of the EU and some Member States of the CBSS are under heavy stress. The trend is towards reduction of current levels and abstention from new institutions. Therefore, initiatives should be cost-effective and feasible to the extent they imply a reshuffling of resources and use of national experts within existing structures in Brussels and in the EUSBSR coordinating edifice.

In accordance with its traditions, Baltic Sea developments are sustained by local regional and civil society forces. This circumstance needs to be further highlighted in civil protection arrangements. Some background information on organisational and governmental arrangements in cross-border areas could be valuable when assessing the feasibility of ways to institutionalise cooperation. (Cf the box-alternatives identified in matrix 1 on page 72.) Two criteria stand out when judging the sufficiency of responses to civil protection crises: cross-border effects and need for assistance. If a situation, although it yields some spill-over effects and reveal critical shortcomings, are coped within the confines of nationally available resources and methods, then it is not so relevant apart from the sharing of information. The national system protects its people and succeeds in accomplishing its social contract. At the other end of the management spectrum one finds multilateral arrangements of a more or less binding nature. Hence a closer analysis of the role of the EU and its relation to the real and perceived needs of the Baltic Sea macro-region within contingency planning and civil protection is helpful.

Before looking at the record, some reflections should be made about networks and decentralised cooperation.

The concept of border and markers delineating human spaces open up several possibilities for host nation responsibility and for receiving and sending assistance. A rich matrix of possible country constellations emerge if relationships between CBSS members were disaggregated into nation-pairs or smaller sets of actors. In exceptional circumstances immediate reaction is often called for. A first set of preventive measures might ward off bigger ills. The specificities of the situation call for practical contacts and established channels that enable a joint cross-border emergency assessment and a shared purpose in arrangements. Given the sparsely populated rural areas in many part of the macro-region, assistance from the other side of the border might be the most efficient, practical and cheap solution for accidents and emergencies.

Measures at the border

Traditionally, “measures at the border” represent institutional discontinuities in all sorts of exchanges between countries. It is a commonplace truth that modern technologies and increased interaction transcend such barrier functions. This is contradicted on the ground by the repeated observation that multi agency coordination is also a complex problem. Administrative boundaries might be as insurmountable as state borders despite their different legal standing. Technological inventions could also be maligned: they recreate boundaries, decrease interoperability and impede cooperation.

Linking the Union and EUSBSR to a macro-regional format
Linking the Union and EUSBSR to a macro-regional format

For sea area boundaries are even more complex issues, given the diversity of rights claimed by states beyond national base lines via their territorial seas and functional or contiguous zones. Suffice it to note the bilateral agreements or understandings that exist nowadays between Baltic Sea region countries on the delimitation of adjacent territorial seas when national claims meet in relatively narrow waters. Assuming a rather limited impact of an incident, conceivable border effects of a common challenge or from an incident originating in the neighbouring country might yield two separate but similar response actions. However, a common challenge behind many emergencies and incidents could mean diverse responses and pose problems of joint action and coordination. The EUSBSR opens up an opportunity for a systematic exploration of border areas in case of cross-border functional emergencies. Between the Nordic countries, an agreement called NORDRED\(^8^4\) has been concluded that regulate assistance in case of an accident. It furthermore opens up for elaboration of direct and mutual commitments between local partners. An inquiry found 74 different agreements with at least one Nordic partner in place.\(^8^5\) The list covers framework agreements as well as different types of formal arrangements concluded between neighbouring territorial entities according to national administrative divisions.

A similar argument about the sea regime and the collective rights of nations is valid for the air space and global atmosphere: the impact of the Eyjafjallajökull Volcanic Eruption on Iceland caused an unprecedented number of disturbances for flight traffic and turned the sea-locked country into a global neighbour; judged by the number of nations affected by cross border cloud effects.

Within the Baltic Sea region, the tradition of coping with hazards at a decentralised level according to the principle of subsidiarity and to engage in functional trans-border cooperation between local and regional authorities is since long established. Data for a comprehensive oversight, however, is lacking. The EU website on Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection\(^8^6\) provides general information about measures and agreements but the overview is short of information from many countries.

Already at the national level, a substantial number of bilateral combinations (country-pairs) are possible:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of border</th>
<th>EU MS 8 macro region members</th>
<th>EU MS 8 and CPM members Iceland and Norway</th>
<th>All CBSS members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared sea borders, fixation of continental shelf or delimitation of territorial waters</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Member States primarily only publish international or national assistance agreements, including those between responsible national authorities. Many agreements on the local/county level were signed during the 1990s but have since become obsolete or receded into oblivion. Valid Polish agreements with bordering German Länder governments apparently cover the entire borderline. Finnish-Russian regional and municipal cross-border agreements proliferated during the 1990s but have since been streamlined within the Neighbourhood policy of EU (ENPI/CBC policies) with the aim to foster development. Norway and Russia have created special arrangements for contacts along their border lands. In the Barents region an agreement on civil protection exercises acknowledges that the required resources close at hand might be across the border.\(^8^7\)

EUSBSR Member States and the use of the Civil Protection Mechanism

A Swedish study of national participation in EU civil protection, 2000-2008, reveals that the EUSBSR countries have been much supportive of these EU instruments.\(^8^8\) They have been more senders than receivers of community support. Correcting for size, Denmark and Sweden are among the members who offer and deploy experts most frequently. Germany and Sweden are among the most willing suppliers of resources to crises in and outside of the Union. Of 22 EU exercises, six were hosted by the eight EUSBSR members. For a longer period including planned exercises in 2014, 11 were arranged by national authorities in the macro region. It is noteworthy that the content of these courses offered on the Union level deviate from the macro-regional priorities and risk profiles of EUSBSR: four dealt with earth quakes and three with CBRN-agents.\(^8^9\)

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84 Find NORDRED Agreement here:


86 Find Civil Protection Vademecum here:

87 Agreement between the governments in the Barents Euro-Arctic region on cooperation within the field of emergency prevention, preparedness and response.


89 Read more about exercises:
The profile is even more evident in organising and hosting EU standardised training courses, where Denmark, Germany and Sweden account for 79% of 146 arrangements. Mechanism countries’ (including Iceland and Norway) share of 515 registered major crisis (a composite measure of crises, estimated damage and lives lost) amounts to barely 4%. The figures do not reveal anything about the gravity of the incident, of course. When checking with average national statistical compilations of daily damages, incidents and emergencies most types of threat and disasters strike Baltic Sea region as well. Conversely, other regions are more often struck by catastrophes and have a more pronounced risk exposure profile. But variations exist between partners in the Mechanism with regard to the threshold for activating the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC). Assistance has been called for in a number of disasters that have hit Latin Europe and certain Eastern European members. The approximately 150 EU interventions or activations for 2007-2011 only record eight entries for EUSBSR incl. four for Iceland. Apart from the ash cloud, the Russian forest fires of 2010 stand out as a major emergency receiving assistance from six other CBSS members.

Rather the conclusion could be that existing structures function well or that nature has been benign. Baltic Sea region countries are quite confident of their systems and its utility and adequacy in relation to daily accidents and repeated incidents. Substantial investments in prevention and preparedness and an improvement in early-warning systems could also have deflected catastrophic developments when facing major emergencies. The need to upscale assistance requests to major international organisations has not been used or found to be necessary. (Matrix 1: box 2 4 and 6 rather than 8) For this reason there are many needs that could be helped by increased cooperation on the regional level within those policies and measures that manage routine and non-catastrophic emergencies. Maintenance and efforts to sustain such capacities require major efforts although they are less spectacular and costly than capacity-building in responses and interventions.

To sum up, these links between EU and national governance exist and are well developed. However, it would be wrong to conclude that a macro-regional platform is redundant or less important. There is a need to clarify formal arrangements for receiving and giving assistance in case of a local to sub-regional/province cross border emergency. (Box 1 in matrix 1) Systematic knowledge about incidents and accidents in the past are dispersed and on case by case basis rather than accumulated to the benefit of an oversight body. Even the preliminary, ambitious stock-taking report produced within 14.3 over the macro-region’s experiences of floods was built on national archives. (Matrix 1 box 1) Even focused examinations of how national systems tacitly

90 See a risk atlas provided by the Prevention, Preparedness and Response to natural and manmade disasters in the Mediterranean

91 Find Fourteen Point Three Notebooks, Blue Book One - Mapping Flooding and Flood Prevention in the Baltic

Find Fourteen Point Three Notebooks - Blue Book Two - Macro-regional Approach through Sharing Experiences in Flood Prevention in the Baltic Sea Region here.
Conclusions and proposals to enhance civil protection cooperation in the EUSBSR and the Baltic Sea region

EUSBSR as a macro region expresses a closer relationship between eight EU Member States. It is also an open entity, including two other members of the civil protection mechanism and a deepening cooperative relationship in disaster risk management with Russia. It has to accommodate its policies and ambitions with the region’s geographical realities and the request for civil protection. EUSBSR is unique in the sense that it is only in this macro-regional part of Europe that the EU and Russia share borders. For this reason, a macro-regional dimension adaptation of the on March 22nd 2013 renewed administrative agreement between EMERCOM and DG ECHO of the European Commission is a justified step.92

The identified risk, hazards, and coping abilities need to be maintained and sustained within the Baltic Sea region. It should be noted that the supply of EU courses and simulations are not designed as field exercises or adapted to prevailing conditions in a regional mission area. As pointed out in the text, there are also challenges ahead. With regard to the criteria of efficiency, technical ability, economy and feasibility, cooperation in a regional format is meaningful and relatively quick.

The following elements constitute the basis for added macro-regional value:

- **A region** often experiences similar types of emergencies and crises.
- **More extensive experience** of a particular type of incident or major damages implies a more efficient situational management and rapid response.
- **A pattern** of interaction is already established, facilitated by relatively similar work methods.
- **The unique characteristics** of the Baltic Sea region is its decentralised nature and the many arrangements that exist for both national and sub-national, formal professional and civil society cooperation.
- **Availability of nearby resources** could decrease response time and costs for logistics.
- **Local transnational solutions** are facilitated by mutual understanding of national protection structures and kinds of decentralised availability of resources.
- **In case of a disaster** that dramatically exhaust available resources, practice and previously established and prepared principles for lead responsibilities facilitate coordination and reception of outside assistance and relief.

It has been already mentioned that the costs of failed prevention are enormous and that the alternative is to develop preparedness. Preparedness facilitates damage limitation and keeps down response costs.

92 See note 38
Conclusions and proposals to enhance civil protection cooperation in the EUSBSR and the Baltic Sea region

Hence planning must consider all contingencies. One often overlooked aspect is to improve awareness about host nation responsibilities in such cases when the challenges outmatch resources and competences.

Here a number of steps and measures should be proposed which could help the institutionalisation of civil protection. The findings and results of the four EUSBSR flagship project 14.3 Task groups are considered. As mentioned they enhance agency competences and harmonise methodologies for coping with those types of emergencies that they are designed for. The question raised is how the added value of a civil protection platform in the format of a macro basin region could be reached.

On this basis and based on the inquiry the main findings can be briefly summarised:

1. There are gaps in analysis, education and training for complex situations and cross-service cooperation.

2. The guidance and lead principles for the EUSBSR pillar 4 and the revised overriding objectives are opaque or absent with regard to an all-hazards approach in a strict sense but a flexible variety based on one flagship project’s – that being EUSBSR flagship project 14.3 - measures with their emphasis on natural hazards could bring added value and enhance overall competence.

3. The European Union is increasing its strategic work in assistance and response. Since 2013, the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) for civil protection has been merged with humanitarian aid into an Emergency Response Centre. It is also predicted that national commitments to supply this level with critical resources will be enhanced and that use and stand-by readiness of national assistance modules will be further elaborated. Separation of responsibilities between DG Home (freedom, security and justice) and DG ECHO (humanitarian aid and civil protection) and between the institutions could become new impediments to all-hazards management if man-made crises and natural disasters are tackled separately. Another institutional division is that between the External Action Service and the two Directorates (DGs) within the Commission.

4. EUSBSR countries as well as all members of the CBSS experience many accidents, incidents and large scale emergencies but few of them have been up-scaled to major international assistance interventions.

5. The flagship project 14.3 has demonstrated the nature and likelihood of events and emergencies that could apply be treated as cross-border functional emergency interdependencies.

6. Based on their own national traditions and patterns of coping with hazards, and in accordance with TEU art 196, the 8 Member States of the EU Baltic Sea macro-region authorities have wide decision latitude with regard to the calibration of personal and material resources to different levels of national and international organisation, for all stages in the civil protection cycle.

7. A problem-based approach to the EUSBSR challenges has many advantages. The distinction between land and sea civil protection and responsibilities for handling emergencies and responses is very sharp. With respect to a major challenge, in a region based on a semi-enclosed sea, many elements come together over EU, national and macro-regional administrative boundaries.

8. Variations in civil protection administration structures and risk assessments exist between all eight Member States as well as between all CBSS members. The knowledge base is insufficient with regard to local transnational arrangements in civil protection matters and inter-institutional relations between decision-making organisations and established networks of civil protection authorities.

9. The planning for civil protection in the Baltic Sea region could benefit from well prepared topic-oriented seminars on themes such as Host Nation Support principles and their application in cooperation with the Union of Baltic States (UBS) and The Baltic Sea States Sub-regional Cooperation (BSSSC).

10. Existing gaps in planning for civil protection in the Baltic Sea region could be overcome by back-to-bach meetings with other EUSBSR priority areas and horizontal actions with a civil protection component, as well as with spatial planning authorities for land and sea.

Research and education is a backbone for drawing lessons and improving prevention and preparedness. A central accumulated stock of case studies and national reports with regard to disasters and mapping of risks facilitate the elaboration of scenarios for training and exercises. One major achievement of the EUSBSR flagship project 14.3 is the production of solid scenarios that could be adapted to Baltic Sea region wide exercises and table-top exercises for operators.

The proposals could hence be divided into analysis and seminar activities, an education and training component, and exploration of new normative instruments.

Analysis, education and training:

- Under the auspices of the existing network of general directors of emergency and national societal security organisations, a small working group or an appointed lead agency could be responsible for planning and realisation of undertakings.

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The design of scenarios and plans for exercises should be broad enough to enlist a number of key stake-holding authorities based on a scheme of simultaneous, severe, dispersed but functionally linked events. A good base is found in the 14.3 flagship project scenarios. The work should be carried out in close cooperation with the CBSS Secretariat. Beyond cooperation with national responsible authorities, other Baltic Sea regional actors should be involved such as non-members and the many national and sub-national authorities that sustain the level of cooperation.

Arrangements should be worked out concerning lead partner responsibility for producing education/lessons learnt material/manual based on contracted studies and for arranging courses and exercises. Three tentative options under the oversight of the CBSS Civil Protection Network Members States with the participation of the EU Commission, could be sketched as follows:

- A pool of visiting experts and selected instructors that set up those courses in professionally certified national education centres.
- A rotating commitment between stake-holding national institutions, as agreed between members in the CBSS Civil Protection Network. A small governing board of experts that certifies courses and quality, and oversee training scenarios which are then contracted with an implementing agent.
- Civil protection does not stop at the sea front. Rather the opposite: changes in urban settlements and increased congestion in coastal areas suggest that a land/shore-to sea gradient should be highlighted as well as tailing into account what is considered and missing in spatial planning off- and on-shore.

**Seminars and workshops on horizontal perspectives**

Flagship project 14.3 has already identified a list of gaps in macro-regional risk assessment tools and capacities in the Baltic Sea region. Among the gaps identified by the project’s Task C which aimed to map macro-regional risks, there are certain analytical challenges relating to extreme weather conditions and climate change. A long term perspective might be needed for preparing emergency authorities to adapt themselves for changes in natural and technological infrastructural relations. Situations might appear when old responses are ineffective and resources inadequate. The EUSBSR cover several climate zones where human conditions could be threatened by changing natural environments.

Civil protection does not stop at the sea front. Rather the opposite: changes in urban settlements and increased congestion in coastal areas suggest that a land/shore-to sea gradient should be highlighted as well as tailing into account what is considered and missing in spatial planning off- and on-shore.

Highlight civil protection perspectives in the work done by other priority areas and HAAs, driven by other motives and objectives, with the aim to evaluate the consequences from the angle of civil protection criteria.

**Normative instruments**

- Training courses and simulation exercises are recognised tools for enhancing preparedness and for stressing problems of coordination and decision-making. They could both be of a desktop-type (table-top) and field-type of event. The latter are costly but most valuable. We have found few exercises that attract a majority of the CBSS Civil Protection Network Member States. Conversely, the EU supported exercises could be of rather exclusive character and only appeal to a few EU Baltic Sea region Member States. Only five countries on average take part in the EU exercises.
- We propose that possible hurdles in some cross-border sites might be overcome by examining whether a central instrument between national authorities could facilitate local follow-up arrangements for exercises and assistance in case of a common challenge or cross border impacts of incidents and big accidents. As a first step to the Baltic Sea region adaptation, we recommend a study of a document regulating such questions between the four governments in the Barents Sea cooperation. **94**
- We look for best practice when it comes to sharing information and definition of the situation on ground in emergencies, i.e. the status of joint assessment teams for cross-border impacts and for operational responsibility in case of assistance. This is both a research task and a practical question of transnational relations and sub-national authorities within the wider framework of the EU Community Mechanism for Civil Protection, and international organisations for local and regional authorities. The finished Nordic study mentioned earlier could incite a systematic investigation of cross-border arrangements in the entire EUSBSR and include neighbouring countries in the Baltic Sea region.

Finally, and as a phase of institutionalisation we can see a more coherent structure of a “Civil Protection Centre of the Baltic Sea Region” based on a rather small headquarter staff that could function as a macro-regional facilitator. It could be built primarily on existing institutions. Its nature and feasibility opens up questions beyond this inquiry. Division of roles and responsibilities must be discussed between the European Commission, the eight EUSBSR Member States, professional networks associated with the CBSS and HELCOM as well as with the CBSS Civil Protection Network authorities.

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A summary sketch of feasibility study proposals

The Prevent, Prepare, Respond, Restore + process in the EUSBSR

- **Prevent**
  - Redefine roles for CBSS Civil Protection Network, the European Commission, 8 EU Member States and relevant EUSBSR PA coordinators

- **Prepare**
  - Back to back PA seminars
  - Explore models and experiences of cross border arrangements with cities, counties and regions

- **Respond**
  - Take stock of cases and practice
  - Commission studies
  - Learning by problem-oriented regional scenarios for multi-agency training and exercises
  - Raising awareness

- **Restore**
  - Horizontal actions on sea / land interface
  - Facilitate conditions for functional cross-border emergency assistance

- **Learn and improve**
  - Redefine roles for CBSS Civil Protection Network, the European Commission, 8 EU Member States and relevant EUSBSR PA coordinators
  - Take stock of cases and practice
  - Commission studies
  - Learning by problem-oriented regional scenarios for multi-agency training and exercises
  - Raising awareness
### Chapter 3: Working to Make it Happen

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There is a request for strategic project guidance. There is a need for supporting the activities in terms of capacity building and project development facilitation. Besides including such flagship projects like Baltic Leadership Programme in Civil Protection, priority area organises workshops on strategic project development. There is a need for a dialogue, experience exchange and representation of civil protection area along other cooperation fields in the Baltic Sea region. There is a need for institutional memory. Baltic Sea region is invited to share experience and inform about their cooperation as a region. In order to avoid overlapping and ensuring that various projects implemented by various stakeholders would not repeat but rather build on the results of previously implemented activities. A dialogue with other frameworks such as EU Danube Region Strategy, Barents Euro-Arctic Council, International Disaster Risk Reduction cooperation frameworks within the UN framework.

Priority Area Secure: A Grid of a Strategic Outlook

An issue in civil security has to be addressed from a macro-regional perspective. A platform is needed for cooperation that is on the level between operational and political/programmes. Region needs to think civil protection strategically and together. Stakeholders need to be engaged. Addressing a new concern has to start. A steering group consists of representatives from various levels, active in both, on-ground cooperation project, and informing programming and policymaking. Priority area for the first time in the Baltic Sea region articulated the urgent need to address the issue of gender mainstreaming in civil protection. Authorities involved in steering of the priority area are committed to define common targets and put them forward in other relevant frameworks. After indication of challenges brought by under-development of cross-sectorial cooperation activities, priority area has started pioneering activities of tackling this issue. Ensures that the network is open and searches for other partners than the “usual suspects”. Provides information and contributions to policy documents.

PA Secure: A Grid of a Strategic Outlook

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Flagship Projects Paving a Way Ahead

By the year 2014, there were two flagship projects finalised under the priority area Secure.

Flagship project
14.3 To Develop Scenarios and Identify Gaps for All Main Hazards in the Baltic Sea Region was the first time that the countries around the Baltic Sea worked together on macro-regional risk.

Baltic Leadership Programme in Civil Protection for Project Managers, designed and led by the Swedish Institute, was the first time that a macro-regional cooperation capacity building and soft-skills training programme for professionals working within civil protection cooperation was developed and implemented.

The results of these two projects lead to further linear development of PA Secure as a whole. In this sense, these flagship projects had a profoundly strategic character.

Follow up project activities are building on the results;
Experiences brought further to the EU level and international level;
Endorsement from regional political cooperation frameworks

The development of baltic leadership programme for future decision makers in civil protection was initiated;
This not only contributes to enhancing capabilities in civil protection cooperation in the Baltic Sea region, but ensures mainstreaming of macro-regional approach within Baltic Sea region civil protection

The need for enhancing leadership and management skills was;
The network was shaped for further operational and strategic cooperation.

The results that bring us forward:

More about the project:

More about the Programme:

The concept of macro-regional risk within the whole Baltic Sea region was discussed;
The first set of guidelines for macro-regional risk assessment were developed;
An operational macro-regional level network was formed.

The need for enhancing leadership and management skills was;
The network was shaped for further operational and strategic cooperation.

The results that bring us forward:

More about the project:

More about the Programme:
Flagship Projects Paving a Way Ahead

Running project

**BalticPrevResilience**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Baltic Everyday accidents, disaster Prevention and Resilience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Description</td>
<td>To increase community awareness and resilience from everyday accidents in the Baltic Sea region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Added Value</td>
<td>Everyday accidents are among the hazards causing highest losses in the Baltic Sea region; the project creates attention to this issue on the macro-regional level and paves way to stronger address it further on the EU level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic approach</td>
<td>To bring the focus on everyday accidents to the macro-regional level and explore the benefits that such an approach can bring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead by</td>
<td>Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency MSB</td>
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More about the project: [Project Ideas](#)

Project ideas that are being developed as EUSBSR seed projects

**ClimUrban**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Climate Change Adaptation for Sustainable Urban Development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Developing a proposal for a project that will support 5-6 coastal cities in the Baltic Sea region in developing local adaptation action plans focusing on flood defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Added Value</td>
<td>Bringing to practice recommendations stemming from collaboration between EUSBSR flagship project Baltadapt and EUSBSR flagship project 14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic approach</td>
<td>Cross-sectorial approach brought in on cooperation level: civil protection and climate change adaptation (EUSBSR PA Secure and HA Sustain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead by</td>
<td>Baltic Environmental Forum Germany</td>
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Citizens for Safety

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Building Urban Safety Through Citizens Participation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Developing a proposal for a project that will explore new technology applications in ensuring safety in cities around the Baltic Sea region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Added Value</td>
<td>Establishes and operationalises a macro-regional approach to urban safety management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic approach</td>
<td>Pioneering attempt to both, enhance macro-regional level local-safety cooperation, and to introduce application of new technological solutions in urban safety management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead by</td>
<td>Gdansk Municipal Guard</td>
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Hazard

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Mitigating Land-Based Hazard Risks in the Baltic Sea Region</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Focusing on risk management processes and macro-regional cooperation in prevention from risks related to storage of hazardous materials on land in the Baltic Sea region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Added Value</td>
<td>Establishing macro-regional level experience and expert exchange process in disaster risk reduction with focus of prevention from risk related to hazardous substances storage in harbour areas around the Baltic Sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic approach</td>
<td>Introducing cross-sectorial and multi-level governance issues in civil protection cooperation from a macro-regional perspective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead by</td>
<td>Turku School of Economics, University of Turku</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Aim of the discussion

Kicking-off Cross-Sectorial and Cross-Institutional Dialogue in Civil Protection Cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region

12 November 2013 / Vilnius, Lithuania
Organised as a back-to-back meeting to the 4th Annual Forum of the EUSBSR

Panel Discussion with:

Toni Fohlin, BSMIR Project Manager at the Finnish Border Guard
Nanna Magnadóttir, Expert on International Cooperation
Mikhail Durkin, Professional Secretary, HELCOM
Juha Rautiärvi, Chairman of the Expert Group on Nuclear and Radiation Safety at the Council of the Baltic Sea States; Finnish Nuclear and Radiation Safety Authority STUK

From “Shoreline” to Working “on Shore”

Civil security in the Baltic Sea region: turning challenges into opportunities for cross-sectorial cross-border cooperation

Aim of the discussion

- To address cross-sectorial civil protection cooperation in the Baltic Sea region including both challenges and opportunities, drawing on a concrete case of receiving international assistance to pollution response on shore in the Baltic Sea region;

- To identify what concrete methodologies, procedures and/or events could be initiated within a macro-regional framework (e.g. EUSBSR PA Secure) in order to facilitate further cross-sectorial cooperation;

- To pave the way further for bringing cross-sectorial cooperation issue to the fore in both, operational and policy cooperation frameworks, and for sharing the experience with other priority areas and strategies.
Civil security is one of the areas where cross-border cooperation between countries presents its immediate value. What enables successful cross-border cooperation is, among other things, developed and agreed cooperation procedures between countries to respond to emergencies and disasters.

Or, to put it in other way, the success lies in knowing whom to call and what to say when something happens. Whom to call, and how to talk. In the forefront of these two, however, lies another defining issue why, for only a shared perspective in this regard would enable finding the best answers to the above mentioned questions.

One of the informal slogans of priority area Secure is based on the idea that major disasters do not stop at natural borders – a nuclear accident at a power plant may result in contamination of areas at sea to which it has a direct water-way access. An oil tanker may collide with a passenger vessel and result not only in a major oil spill at sea and fire on the vessel, but also the need for an immediate Search-and-Rescue operation on water and emergency response on land. Shoreline, in this case, becomes an example of a place where responsibilities of several institutions and cooperation sectors meet. It is still a demarcation line, and success may depend on whether you know how it divides and/or how it connects.

While this can be a simplified way to define a more complex issue, experts in the Baltic Sea region consider it from a concrete perspective, referring to, for instance, the issue of receiving international assistance to pollution response on the shore in the Baltic Sea region, in terms of administrative and legal challenges. One way forward in resolving potential difficulties could be taken by comparing and drawing experiences from cross-border civil protection operations that have already happened in the region. Macro-regional cooperation frameworks such as the EUSBSR provide an advantageous setting for experience exchange of this kind.

As a priority area that is defined by its claim for interoperability, cohesion and cooperation, PA Secure activities must grasp and address this complexity of accidents and disasters that “do not care for...”. Project BRISK (Sub-regional risk of spill of oil and hazardous substances in the Baltic Sea) – a flagship project under priority area 14 which was a prequel to PA Secure – tackled the question “why”, namely by giving us a joint understanding that the Baltic Sea is one of the most trafficked seas in the world. At the same time, it is one of the most environmentally sensitive.

Subsequently, the question “how” had its moment with another flagship project under the same priority area, namely the project 14.3. In the process of developing macro-regional risk scenarios based on all-hazards approach specific challenges were disclosed as being rooted in the absence of common disaster management language among authorities in the region. While the necessity for a cross-sectorial approach was identified, the question “how” exactly to talk and in how many alternative ways – still remains open.

In much the same way we need to focus on the question whom? While the project BRISK brought together mainly maritime operations related authorities, the project 14.3 became a setting for “language learning” between land based civil protection authorities in the Baltic Sea region. But how far are we in terms of finding constructive cross-sectorial bridges? Especially if we know that the complexities of the issue start long before facing accidents or experiencing hazards. They start with definitions.

Experts from the HELCOM working group RESPONSE have already agreed to replace the term “shoreline” to that “on shore”, as the former one was causing confusion between the Member States of the Helsinki Commission: how far out in the water does the shoreline response go? Working group members found out that the answer differs depending on each country in the Baltic Sea region. The Law Department at the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency had confirmed that “shoreline” is not one of the defined terms in any legal framework. Thus the ways to deal with it had to be discussed and agreed between countries from the region, represented at the working group. The decision reached was the adoption of the terminology of response “at sea” and “on shore” within HELCOM. The definition of response of shore was formulated in the HELCOM Response manual VolIII, which was adopted at the HELCOM Ministerial Meeting in Copenhagen, 3 October 2013.

Having in mind the outlined issues, PA Secure initiated this back-to-back event during the 4th Annual Forum of the EUSBSR, aiming to locate the concrete contribution that PA Secure as a priority area can bring in terms of facilitating concrete cross-sectorial themes that are the most fundamental to civil security cooperation in the Baltic Sea region. Organisers invited participants from various civil security related organisations and agencies across the region to participate in a discussion that is expected to not only facilitate further cooperation efforts among civil security stakeholders, but also to be brought forward in the form of methodological suggestions for the benefit of other priority areas and cooperation frameworks.

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Conclusions and Initial Recommendations
From the priority area Secure event

Nanna Magnadóttir

Background

Priority Area Secure (PA Secure) has paid specific attention to the way that borders, be they geographical or administrative, vertical or horizontal, inhibit the application of a comprehensive approach to the cycle of civil protection. During the review of the Action Plan of the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR), which ended early 2013, PA Secure was seized by issues surrounding the natural border between land and sea, namely the shoreline.

The shoreline around the Baltic Sea is close to 70000 km in length with the nine countries bordering it having the responsibility to manage anything from less than a 100 km strip (Lithuania) to more than 46000 km (Finland) The Baltic Sea states manage this as part of their sovereign right and duty and with reference to international and regional standards developed by the International Maritime Organisation, the European Union and HELCOM as well as through cooperative frameworks such as the Council of the Baltic Sea States and VASAB.

A basic review of the EUSBSR Action Plan reveals the intricacies in addressing the shoreline. Several priority areas (e.g. PA Safe, PA Secure) and horizontal actions (e.g. HA Sustain, HA Involve) and a multitude of the actors involved otherwise in the implementation of the Action Plan can be seen as natural partners when it comes to dealing with issues on shore. It is therefore important that they see themselves as such and not as competitors. While it is understandable and even desirable that goals for the region overlap it is important not to overlap, when it comes down to the activity level. The activities should contribute together to create a maximum impact.

We are in a climate where we are moving away from managing response to emergencies to managing the risk of emergencies and with the Baltic Sea highly trafficked and environmentally sensitive the risks are many where sea and land meet on shore. Not only is there a risk of pollution but also of flooding and other disasters caused by extreme weather events. The risk is both to the environment and to the population.

To combat the consequences of any of these risks interoperability is demanded, not only between national systems but also within any one system across sectors. Only in this way can an interdependent region not only be safe and secure but thrive.

Bearing all of the above in mind the panellists and attendees explored the practicalities of the cooperative architecture of the Baltic Sea region vis-a-vis the need for acting on shore in a cohesive manner. The panel agreed that the discussion touched only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to cross-sectoral civil protection cooperation in the Baltic Sea region and the challenges and opportunities it poses. A number of topics were highlighted however where it would be beneficial to further facilitate cooperation within the region.
Lack of definitions

Several areas where definitions are lacking were highlighted during the discussion, in particular it was noted that:

- A shared meaning of key concepts is missing. This has come out strongly in different projects and can seriously hamper cooperation between sectors and borders;
- There is a grey area between open seas and shoreline that remains somewhat undefined allowing for confusion in who should act, when and how.

Finally, it was noted that a multitude of partners at all levels can be involved in cooperation in this field, from the municipal to the national to the international level, on a community basis and with the participation of civil society and business and private companies alike. It might therefore be worth exploring concepts such as corporate social responsibility and public private partnerships with a view to a more integrated approach when working on shore.

Knowledge management

A number of projects have been undertaken in the framework of EUSBSR, e.g. BRISK (Sub-regional risk of spill of oil and hazardous substances in the Baltic Sea), flagship project 14.3 (Macro-regional Risk Scenarios and gaps identification) and BSMIR (Baltic Sea Maritime Incident Response Survey.) The result is increased knowledge and a whole library of lessons learned that needs to be maintained and applied. It was suggested that the capture and upkeep of this knowledge should be institutionalised regionally to avoid its loss. This would also create conditions for cross-fertilisation between current and past projects.

Expecting the unexpected

By definition civil security depends on expecting the unexpected. An oxymoron in itself, expecting the unexpected boils down to preventing, preparing and responding to the unexpected, i.e. looking out for the Black Swan that may appear at any time. By contrast other sectors mainly deal with the expected, maritime spatial planning focuses for instance on planning when and where human activities take place at sea. In this case the planned and the unplanned meet on shore where tools such as integrated coastal management come in handy. It was noted that initiating a discussion to compare these different approaches would be useful particularly in light of the European Commission proposal of a draft Directive establishing a framework for maritime spatial planning and integrated coastal management and the potential role that civil protection authorities will have therein.

A competency based approach

As stated above, the very unexpectedness of events defines civil security and civil protection, any risk that is conceivable is prepared for, the other by definition not. The only way to handle this is by having the competencies needed to minimise the consequences. Several areas that would need further development were identified:

- The baseline of the level of general competencies in the region should be found;
- An inventory of the competencies in the region would be useful;
- An analysis of the role of the diverse competencies and the relationship between them is desirable;
- Particular attention should be paid to middle managers that are required to act decisively and manage both upwards and downwards during a crisis situation as project findings in the region suggest that not enough competencies are vested in the middle.

All of the above should pave the way for sharing competencies and pooling resources in the region in a climate where human and financial resources are scarce.
The main novelty adopted during the review process was the introduction of a separate priority area to address potential land-based hazard risks in the Baltic Sea region.

According to the earlier version of the Action Plan, civil protection related priority areas (numbered 13 and 14), articulated the emphasis on maritime safety and security, with one exception of civil protection against land-based disasters being a subject of just one flagship project.

The new PA Secure represents Baltic Sea region cooperation in protection from emergencies and accidents on land.

Development of an extensive approach toward land-based civil protection cooperation issues in the reviewed EUSBSR Action Plan reflects general trends in the region on macroregional disaster management and prevention issues.

The first launching event of the EUSBSR PA Secure took place at the Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU in Brussels, 21 February 2013.

22 February 2013 the European Commission disseminated the reviewed Action Plan to the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR) the first EU macroregional strategy that was adopted in 2009. On the evening before, 21 February 2013, an event was hosted in Brussels, at the Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU – a discussion Impact of Macroregional Cooperation in the EU: What Leadership in Civil Protection Can Do? – where panellists from the Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU, as well as the European Commission (DG REGIO and DG ECHO) joined representatives of civil protection authorities from eight Baltic Sea region EU Member States (Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Denmark, Germany) to inquire how the EUSBSR has had an impact on civil protection cooperation in the Baltic Sea region.

This event provided a face to Baltic Sea region cooperation in the area of civil protection, and was the first public event of Priority area Secure, one of priority areas of the EUSBSR. PA Secure highlights one of several new elements introduced during the review of the EUSBSR Action Plan, the process that was launched following adoption of the EU General Affairs Council Conclusions on 26 June 2012.
The year 2012 saw an increased level of interest within the area of civil protection cooperation in the Baltic Sea region addressing macroregional risk scenarios. This marked a significant shift from a paradigm of a highly connected (mainly through bi- and trilateral agreements between Member States) region to a macro-region that is ready to launch a process of developing a common approach toward macroregional risk, from an all-hazards based perspective. In January 2012 the first project of such kind was launched – 14point3. This project, as a EUSBSR flagship project, became a study case of how a political framework can be utilized to address current issues in the region.

"The key to the success of the EUSBSR, as well as to individual areas within the Strategy, is to let the institution follow the way each area develops itself. Symbiosis of EUSBSR and civil protection cooperation in the Baltic Sea region has proven to be a good example of such evolutionary approach to cooperation," said Anders Lindholm, councillor responsible for Regional policy and State aid, who also follows the EUSBSR at the Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU.

The importance of the latter was emphasized by Colin Wolfe, Head of Competence Centre on Macro-regions and European Territorial Cooperation in the DG for Regional and Urban Policy, European Commission. According to him, macro-regional strategies in the EU provide a setting to develop an "in-between engagement", linking National Member States level and overall EU 27 level.

"When the idea of the EUSBSR was born, it evolved around a goal to provide a common framework which can mobilize policy makers to address together matters such, among others, civil protection or environment; this was followed by a need to link up thinking and priorities in distributing funds, arranging programmes and setting up projects," explained Mr Wolfe.

Ian Clarke, Head of Policy and Implementation frameworks unit at DG Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection, European Commission, assessed recent shift in Baltic Sea region civil protection cooperation under the new PA Secure from a broader EU civil protection and disaster management cooperation perspective.

In his view, the way how this cooperation is now coordinated in the Baltic Sea region, places its stakeholders in a position to join forces in the development of their policies; this, in turn, relates to the fact that the region as such may be in a privileged position to access funds that have been assigned through regional programmes.

To take a leading position in such a setting would be to also look into general disaster management priorities in the EU.

These could provide a good knowledge base from the Baltic Sea region to inform the rest of the EU,

- building capacities in risk assessment;
- cross-sectoral activities between civil protection and research;
- raising awareness to policy level and to the general public;
- and finally a common approach from the Baltic Sea region countries to international negotiations in disaster management, such as the Hyogo Framework.

Ad hoc assessment of macroregional cooperation impact in the EU in terms of Baltic Sea region civil protection cooperation, organised by the EUSBSR PA Secure, resulted in a common agreement that it is still early to draw quantitative figures on both, the increase of civil protection level in the region and on what amount of resources have been saved as a result of that. The next step for the EUSBSR itself is indeed to finalise the process of defining its targets and indicators. When it comes to land-based civil protection and PA Secure, however, the quantitative increase in cooperation initiatives of fully macroregional dimension is already visible (from one to four.) This increase is currently resulting in mobilised actions aiming to inform policy makers of the current trends, needs and concerns of civil protection area in the Baltic Sea region and beyond.

The event Impact of Macroregional Cooperation in the EU: What Leadership in Civil Protection Can Do? Baltic Sea Region Example at the Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU was organised within the framework of one of the flagship projects listed under the new PA Secure, a project Baltic Leadership Programme in Civil Protection, initiated and implemented by the Swedish Institute. Besides the flagship projects, PA Secure also works horizontally, continuing a dialogue with the new EUSBSR Horizontal Action (HA) Sustainable Development (on Climate Change Adaptation issues), HA Neighbours (cooperation with Russia), and HA Involve.
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